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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EMINENT DOMAIN: JUST COMPENSATION UNDER THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT AS MEASURED BY JUST COMPENSATION UNDER
THE FOURTEENTH: WHETHER REVOCABLE PRIVILEGE TO BE
DISREGARDED*
The Tennessee Valley Authority brought proceedings to condemn about
12,000 acres of land in North Carolina in and along the Hiawassee River,
in pursuance of a project for the development of the Tennessee River
system for hydroelectric power production, navigation, and flood control.
The lands involved in this suit were taken by the Government over a period
of years, starting in 1936. At that time, the Southern States Power Company,' a North Carolina corporation, and its wholly owned subsidiary, a
Georgia corporation, owned a smhll hydroelectric generating plant on a
tributary of the Hiawassee, known as the Murphy plant. This plant had a
distribution system which supplied the surrounding territory. These companies also owned about 22,000 acres of land on both sides of the Hiawassee
and its tributary, the Nottely. Their holdings included land at four dam
sites: a large part of the land necessary for dam projects at two of the
sites, and some of the land, necessary for similar projects at .the other
two sites. The property condemned included the Murphy plant, but the
award therefor was not appealed from.
Southern is successor to a corporation created by a special act of the
North Carolina legislature in 1909. That corporation was granted broad
powers and authorized to exercise eminent domain along -nonnavigable
streams of North Carolina. Nonnavigability of the Hiawassee along the
lands involved was stipulated. Powelson, an experienced engineer, from
1913 to 1931 surveyed and acquired these lands and developed and promoted a plan for constructing an integrated four-dam hydroelectric power
project on these rivers and at these sites. After extensive litigation, lasting
until 1925, with another water-power company possessing eminent domain
powers, Southern's prior right of eminent domain had been established.
The actual cost of the lands involved in this case was $277,821.56. The
total sum invested by Southern in the 22,000 acres through 1935 was
$1,061,942.53.
All except 2000 acres of the 12,000 acres taken were rough and mountainous. They had little value except when joined with other lands for
water-power purposes. The Government, contending that the lands had no
water-power value, argued for a valuation of $95,000 to $165,000. The
condemnee sought a water-power valuation of $7,500,000. A three-man"
commissioners' court found the lands had water-power value, and awarded
*The expressions of opinion herein contained are the personal opinions of the writer,
and may not, therefore, be represented as official Department of Justice opinions.
'For purposes of this suit, this corporation had assigned its rights to Powelson.
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$1,437,000, plus $253,000 for severance damages to lands not taken. On
review before a three-judge district court, water-power value was found but
the award was reduced to $976,289.40, plus $211,791.23 as severance damages. On appeal the circuit court of appeals reduced the severance damages
by $100,000, but affirmed the judgment otherwise.'
In the Supreme Court, the Government's primary arguments against consideration of water-power value were: that the United States bad plenary
power over the flow of nonnavigable portions of the. Hiawassee because of
the direct effect of the flow of tile stream at such portions on the navigable
part of the river; that there was no water-power value because the project
was not commercially feasible, and because the corporation's power of eminent domain should be disregarded in determining whether there could be
the necessary union of lands for the project.3
Held, United States v. Powelson, - U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1047 (1943),
Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for a majority of five Justices, reversed. The
value of the land is to be determined without consideration of water-power
value. "We do not see why the protection given to 'private property' under
the Fifth Amendment imposes upon the United States a duty to provide
a higher measure of compensation for these lands than would be imposed
by the Fourteenth Amendment upon the state if it were the taker."4 "We
merely hold that the United States, in absence of a specified statutory requirement, need not make compensation for the loss of a business opportunity based on the unexercised privilege to use the power of eminent
domain when the state need not do so were it the sponsor of the public
project and the taker of the lands." 5
Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the minority, said that they understood
"the Court to hold that property physically adaptable to power purposes,
taken by the Federal Government for power purposes among others, is to
be valued as worthless for power purposes as matter of law because its
projected development might be defeated if the State should revoke the
power of eminent domain admittedly possessed by the owner at the time
of the taking. We think it denies proper effect to State law and policy in
effect at the time of the taking."6
The unusual manner in which the Court placed its decision upon a rationale not pressed by able counsel makes this case worthy of a place in
courses of jurisprudence which purport to analyze how courts act.7 The
2
1n each instance the decision was unanimous.
3

1n all, the Government advanced seven legal propositions, some of them of con-

siderable merit. See Main Brief for the Government, pp. 2-4, United States v. Powelson,
319 U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1047 (1943).
4
United States v. Powelson, 319 U. S. -, -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1047, 1057 (1943).
5Id. at -, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1054.
6
d. at -, 63 Sup. Ct. at 1058.
7
Propositions of law were advanced in the Government's petition for certiorari and
in the opposing brief. After certiorari was granted, the Government filed a brief of
112 pages. In the brief for the first time the point of revocability of the power of eminent
domain by the State of North Carolina is noted in a footnote (n. 41). Respondent's brief
of 118 pages does not mention this point. The Government filed a reply brief which did
not discuss this point. Argument was had on March. 12 and 13, 1942. With the leave of
the Court, the Government, after the argument, filed a supplemental brief and the re-
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Court, apparently, had serious qualms about deciding the issue of the Federal Government's powers in respect to nonnavigable waters.8 The majority
intimates strongly that in determining market value of land as part of a
combination with other lands, "the power of effecting the change by eminent
domain must be left out," but shies away from placing its holding on that
ground, possibly because the cases of McGovern v. New York 9 and New
York v. Sage,'0 which contain language supporting this statement, are somewhat inconsistent with Olson v. United States,"i United States v. ChandlerDunbar Water Co.,1 2 and Ford Hydro-Electric Co. v. Neely.' 3

In view of the Court's failure to direct counsel's attention to the rationale
which appears in the Court's opinion, it comes with some surprise to find
Mr. Justice Douglas saying: "No precedent has been advanced which suggests that a different measure of compensation should be required where the
United States rather than the state is the taker of the property for a public
project. Nor has any reason been suggested why as a matter of principle
there should be a different measure of compensation in such a
or policy
14
case."'
The Court's reliance upon the measure of damages under state law as a
maximum for damages in a federal condemnation is not consistent with the
oft held rule that in federal condemnations the question of damages is one
of federal and not of state law. 15 In Tilden z,. United States,"6 the court
spondent filed a rejoinder brief and, at the request of the Court, a memorandum of testimony relating to the effect of respondent's proposed operation on navigation and flood
control. These additional documents dealt with the question of the extent of the Federal
Government's control over nonnavigable streams. An order of June 8, 1942, provided for
a reargument before the Court limited to questiont presented in points II to VII in the
Government's main brief. Counsel were also requested to discuss the legislative history
of a section of the T.V.A. Act. The case was reargued on March 1'and 2, 1943. The
Government filed a brief and the respondent filed two briefs. Neither party discussed the
ratio decidendi of the Court. In the circuit court of appeals, the Lands Division of the
Department of Justice-the Government agency which handles all federal condemnations"
outside of those catried on by the T.V.A.-as amicus curiae filed a brief in support of
a motion for reargument. This point was not raised. In the published opinions of the
circuit court of appeals and of the district court this point is not discussed.
8
Apparently the Government did not raise this point until it petitioned for reargument
before the circuit court of appeals. See Brief for Respondent on Reargument on Point 1,
p. 2, United States v. Powelson, 319 U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1047 (1943).
9229 U. S. 363, 33 Sup. Ct. 876 (1913).
10239 U. S. 57, 36 Sup. Ct. 25 (1915).
11292 U. S. 246, 54 Sup. Ct. 704 (1934).
12229 U. S. 53, 33 Sup. Ct. 667 (1913).
1313 F. (2d) 361 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 723, 47 Sup. Ct. 112
(1926). See ORGEL, VALUAT'ION UNDER EmINNT DoMMt (1936) 276, § 88. See also,
Ham, Yearsley & Pyrie v. Northern Pacific Ry., 107 Wash. 378, 181 Pac. 898 (1919),
app. dism. -259 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 588 (1922); Idaho Farm Development Co. v.
Brackett,
36 Idaho 748, 213 Pac. 696 (1923).
154
S. -- ,
63 Sup. Ct. 1047, 1054 (1943).
' United States
States v.
v. Powelson,
Miller, 317319
U. U. 369,
63 Sup. Ct. 276 (1943) ; United States v.
Alcorn, 80 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) ;1.Town
of Nahant v. United States, 136
Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 1st, 1905); United States v. 2715.98 Acres of Land, 44 F. Supp.
683 (W. D. Wash. 1942); United States v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811,
818 (E. D. Tenn. 1941).
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held a condemnee entitled to a higher award from the Federal Government
than would have been necessary if the state were the taker.
Resort to what may be done under the Fourteenth Amendment to find
out what may be done under the Fifth Amendment, when applied to the
situation before the Court, seems neither sound in principle nor in accordance with the precedents. When a state takes property, undoubtedly any
interest the state had in the property prior to the taking would be considered
in determining the amount it must pay. It is hardly likely that both the
Federal Government and the state would have identical interests in a piece
of property; the contrary is much more likely to be true. A right, privilege
or power given by a state in respect to property within a state may not only
be dissimilar from that stemming from the Federal Government, but may
even be beyond the power of the latter to give. And this is true of conditions which the different sovereigns may attach to their grants. To say that
in such a situation a taking by the Federal Government involves the same
considerations as a taking by the state ignores, if it does not deny, a difference in powers and right between the two sovereigns in respect to lands
within a state. 17 The taking by the Federal Government of municipal properfy is compensable under the Fifth Amendment,' 8 even though the state
could take the property without compensation.19 This decision may indeed
be thought to derogate from the state's sovereignty. The state did not delegate to the Government its power of revocation or its power of eminent
domain ;20 yet the Government is treated as if it had received such delegation.
The political importance of the state's grant of the power of eminent domain and the significance of its power of revocation are diminished if, without possessing either, the Federal Government may act as if it had both.
The decision, furthermore, takes from the state much of the state's benefit
from the water-power value of the lands. The lands are now the Government's; the water power in the hands of a Government agency certainly
is less amenable to state regulation than it would be in the hands of a state
corporation. There is not even a fund in the hands of the condemnee representing
water-power value which the state could reach by taxation or other21
wise.
1610 F. Supp. 377 (W. D. La. 1934).
17See Town of Nahant v. United States, 136 Fed. 273, 276-277 (C. C. A. 1st, 1905);
cf. Gouax v. Bovay, 105 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
189United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 43 F. Supp. 687, 689 (D. Md. 1942).
1 United States v. Wheelers Tp., 66 F. (2d) 977 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); Town of
Bedford v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927); Town of Nahant v.
United
States, 136 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 1st, 1905).
20
1n early days, the Federal Government commonly took property under state law.
See FEDERAL EMINENT DOMAIN (1940) 2, 111. Occasionally it still takes property un-

der a delegation from the state. In re Certain Land in Lawrence, 119 Fed. 453 (D.
Mass. 1902)). In many states, including North Carolina, statutes have been'passed
empowering the United States to condemn for certain purposes and prescribing the
rules for ascertaining compensation.
21Cf. St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U. S. 92, 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 485,
489 (1893) : ". . . it is not within the competency *of the national government to ...
appropriate ... the benefit of any of its corporations or grantees, without suitable compensation to the State."
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The Court's contention, that in a taking of these lands by North Carolina
water power value would be ignored, has little basis. 22 In North Carolina,
in determining the value of lands, their value for water power purposes may
be considered if the necessary union of lands for that purpose is reasonably
probable and reasonably practicable by the exercise of the power of eminent
domain or otherwise.m It would seem unlikely, therefore, that such value
would be held recoverable by an owner not possessing the power of union
and denied to one having such power, since it is the land which is taken
and not the power.2 4 In fact, it seems fairly clear that the North Carolina
courts, in a case in which this condemnee's predecessor was the condemnor,
approved the consideration of water power value.2 5 It does not follow from
the fact that a power or even a franchise may be taken without compensation that property operated under such franchise may be taken and compensated for as if operated without a franchise.26
Put somewhat differently, if just compensation would require payment of
water power value because of the existence of available purchasers of lands
for that purpose, it should follow that similar payment must be made to
an owner holding the lands for that purpose and having a prior right over
these lands with other lands necessary
other available purchasers to unite
2
for a water power development. 7
22

The Court cites Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 107 Pac. 199 (1910)
and Sears v. Akron, 246 U. S. 242, 38 Sup. Ct. 245 (1918) as indicating that a private
power company's privilege to use the power of eminent domain need not be reflected
in the valuation if the property be taken by the state. The first case held that the
fact the property was employed for a public use by the company would not preclude
its taking by the city; the court refused to allow profits from the power plant to be considered, and affirmed a value which included water power value. 36 SHEPARI'S PACIFIC
REPoRTER CiTATrONs 84 (Supp., Aug. 1943), puzzled perhaps over the use of this case
by the Supreme Court, ties it up to the first headnote in the case, which headnote states
that property may not be taken for a private use. The doubtful applicability of the
Sears case is brought out in the minority opinion. The Sears case was held inapplicable
by the North Carolina Supreme Court, in a suit between Southern's predecessor and
another power company over the former's prior right of eminent domain. CarolinaTennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River P. Co., 175 N. C. 668, 682-683, 96 S. E.
98, 105 (1918). The North Carolina court went further and said that if the Sears case
was applicable it would not be governed by it. The majority's use of this case to suplaw would be is, to say the least, odd.
port
23 its views of what the North Carolina
Nantahala P. & L. Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 17 S. E. (2d) 10 (1941).
24At times the majority opinion reads as if the Court thinks the Federal Government
took the condemnee's power of eminent domain rather than its lands. On the point
of noncompensability for loss of ability to exercise that power. support is found in
Adirondack Railway v. New York State, 176 U. S. 335, 20 Sup. Ct. 460 (1900);
Hood v. United States, 49 Ct. Cls. 669 (1913-14).
The power has not been taken or revoked by these proceedings. Cf. United States v.
Big Bend Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459, 474-475 (E. D. Wash. 1941). If T.V.A. were
to transfer these lands to private persons, Southern probably could retake the lands by
condemnation.
25
Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 186 N. C. 179, 183,
11926 S.E. 213, 215 (1923).
Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U. S. 180, 30 Sup. Ct 615 (1910).
27Gardner Water Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Gardner, 185 Mass. 190, 69 N. E.
1051 (1904).
In view of the, contest of Southern with other companies desiring to exercise emi-
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Southern probably had added to the value of the instant lands by having
already united them with a substantial amount of other lands necessary for
the project-and most of the lands had been acquired, apparently, by purchase. Southern is hardly to be penalized for having secured the power of
eminent domain from the state. The obligations assumed by Southern toward
the state in the exercise of the power would seem to warrant consideration
of the grant of power as more than a gratuity.28 It may be noted that there
is authority to the effect that where a special commercial value of land
depends upon rights which do not pass to a purchaser by virtue of the
purchase, the value is not to be disregarded when the lands are taken in
eminent domain.2 9
The water power value of lands held by a water power company has been
considered in a taking by a political unit of a state.80 To look only at the
fact that in order to realize the value of a particular piece of land for a
certain purpose it is necessary to unite it with other lands, improperly ignores
any reasonable possibility that because of the location of this piece of land
there might be prospective (perhaps actual) buyers of that parcel, who would
purchase it to use for that purpose. This possibility exists as long as there
are prospective buyers of lands for that purpose, whethef or not at a given
point of time they have acquired or have the power to acquire the other
lands. It has been realistically pointed out that the difficulties of land
acquisition almost always inherent in any sizeable water power project have
not deterred promoters of such projects, and customarily have not been
found insurmountable. 31 It would seem that the emphisis should be on the
likelihood of a project for this purpose by entrepreneurs other than the
condemnor rather than on the necessity of union with other property to
effect this purpose.8 2 The attitude of prospective purchasers of- the land
toward the possibility, and probability of the projects being effected should
also be considered.3
The minority points out that "never until now has it [the Court] held
nent domain over these lands for water power purposes, it seems clear that there was
a market for this land for water pow er purposes in which there was more than one
prospective buyer. In so far as other private buyers were concerned, Southern had,
in effect, a prior option. Cessation of purchasing activity prior to the taking should,
however,
be considered.
28
Carolina-Tennessee Power Co. v. Hiawassee River P. Co., 175 N. C. 668, 677, 96
S. E. 99, 103 (1918); cf. City of New York v. Storin, 106 N. Y. 1, 19, 12 N. E. 628,
636-637
29
01d (1887).
South Ass'n v. City of Boston, 212 Mass. 299, 99 N. E. 235 (1912) ;
Ehret v.
Schuylkill, 151 Pa. 158, 24 Atl. 1068 (1892).
30 Tacoma v. Nisqually Power Co., 57 Wash. 420, 107 Pac. 199 (1910). Cf. Ham,
Yearsley & Pyrie v. Northern Pac. Ry., 107 Wash. 378, 181 Pac. 898 (1919).
3lMetropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams, 116 P. (2d) 7 (Cal. 1941). A rehearing was
granted in this case and its judgment modified, but on what ground and to what extent
does not appear. See 19 Cal. (2d) 463, 122 P. (2d) 257 (1942). Whether the prior
can still be considered that of the court is not clear.
opinion
32
Union Exploration Co. v. Moffat Tunnel, 104 Colo. 109, 121-125, 89 P. (2d) 257,
263-265
(1939).
33
McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S.342, 56 Sup. Ct. 764 (1936) ; Chicago, B.
& Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 249-250, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 589-590 (1897).
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that the law requires prese.nt values to be determined as if legally possible,
but factually improbable changes have already taken place."'3 4 It is one
thing to consider the possibility of Government changes affecting the value
of property,3 5 but it is hard to see how the remoteness of such possibility
can be deemed irrelevant.3 6 Thus, when the Government sought to deduct
special benefits to the remaining land from the value of property taken,
the Court thought the possibility of the Government's taking away such
benefits too remote to prevent the deduction. 37 It is submitted that the rule
should work both ways. Thus, in State v. McKelvey,38 it was held proper
to consider, in evaluating the property taken, that traffic went by the property and zoning ordinances restricted the use of surrounding property.
,It may be that when, in eminent domain proceedings, a revocable privilege
is taken or the value claimed to attach to the land taken depends upon a
gratuitous revocable privilege, compensation should be denied, at least when
a different resu.t would be equivalent to rejection of the right3 9of the holder
of the power of revocation to revoke without paying therefor. But the objectivity of the market value-is abandoned, if this rule is applied to a case
where prospective purchasers. would think the chance of change too slight
40
to refrain from buying the property for the purpose for which it was used.
Where a privilege is revoked, an owner is hardly in a position to insist
upon a valuation in condemnation proceedings as though it had not been
revoked. 41 And where the tenuousness of the interest is such that an informed buyer would pay nothing therefor, no compensation should be forth3
4United States v. Powelson, 319 U. S. -, -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1047, 1060 (1943). Mr.
Justice Jackson posits several striking hypothetical situations to illustrate the illogic
of 35the principle adopted by the majority opinion.
Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, "53 Sup. Ct. 177 (1932). 'Cf. Brooks-Scanlon
v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, 123, 44 Sup. Ct. 471, 474-475 (1923).
Corp.
6
8 Mellon v. Weston Dodson & Co., 20 F. (2d) 549, 552 (C. C. A. lst, 1927). Cf.
Spokane Falls etc. Ry. v. Ziegler, 167 U. S. 65, 17 Sup. Ct. 728 (1897).
VUnited States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U. S. 411, 46 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926) ; cf. United
States v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811 (E. D. Tenn. 1941).
Idaho 233, 72 P. (2d) 699 (1937).
3858
3
9Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 14 How. 79 (U. S. 1852); Sanitary
District v. Loughran, 150 Ill. 362, 43 N. E. 359, (1896) ; Clapp v. Boston, 133 Mass.
367 (1882); Raulet v. Concord Railroad Corp., 62 N. H. 561 (1883)-actually the
condemnee received the value of his land as if the privilege still continued; In re Low,
233 N. Y. 334, 135 N. E. 521 (1922); It re Neptune Avenue, 254 App. Div. 690, 3
N. Y. S. (2d) 825 (2d Dep't 1938), aff'd w.o., 280 N. Y. 604, 20 N. E. (2d) 557
(1939); Hatch v. Cincinnati & Indiana R.R., 18 Ohio St. 92, 122 (1868); Gillespie
v. Bd. of Comrs. of Albany County, 47 Wyo. 1, 30 P. (2d) 797 (1934) ; cf. Hood v.
United States, 49 Ct. Cls. 669 (1913-14). A few of these cases are not readily distinguishable from the cases cited infira, n. 43. Generally, however, the cases which have
denied recovery were cases Where the facts showed that the privilege existed not by
virtue of an express grant of privilege, but by failure of one to exercise his right of
refusal to permit a use, and generally they have been cases where the use has been of
property
other than the property taken.
4
oIt has been said that over 50% of the water power development in the West was
made under Government permits revocable at any time. KERwiw, FEDERAL WATER POWER
LEGISLATION (1926) 41.
41
United States v. Wauna Toll Bridge, 130 F. (2d) 855 (C.. C. A. 9th, i942).
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coming in eminent domain proceedings. 42 But there are many authorities
which have followed the market practice and refused to consider property
taken in eminent domain as of no value because of the possibility of a loss
or diminution of value from revocation of a right, power or privilege, where
the probability of such contingency was not likely to deter purchasers. 43
Pertinent to the instant case are the remarks of the commissioners in

Gardner Water Co. v. Inhabitants of Toun of, Gardner:44 "In valuing the
company's water sources as defined above, the control and rights of the
state in or over the same as therein set forth are to be borne in mind, as
also the probability or improbability that these powers will in fact be
exercised."
Whether the Supreme Court will take the extreme position that lands
bordering streams have no water power value as against the United States 45
remains to be seen, but the instant case goes a long way in that direction. 4G

,Philip Marcus*
*Special Assistant to the United States Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington,
D. C.
42
United States v. 10.245 Acres of Land, 50 F. Supp. 470 (E. D. Wash. 1943).
43
- Viejo v. United States, 133 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 1st, 1943); United States v.
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 113 F. (2d) 919 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940), rev. on different
groutd, 312 U. S. 592, 61 Sup. Ct. 772 (1941) ; United States v. Wheeler Tp., 66 F.
(2d) 977 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); United States v. 25.86 Acres of Land, 49 F. Supp.
250 (E. D. N. Y., 1943); State v. McKelvey, 58 Idaho 233, 72 P. (2d) 699 (1937) ;
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Pittsburg, Ft. 'W. & C. Ry.,, 216 Ill. 575, 75 N. E. 248
(1905); Kentucky & W. Virginia P. Co. v. Elkhorn City Land Co., 212 Ky. 624, 279
S. W. 1082 (1926); Waukeag Ferry Ass'n v. Arey et at., 128 Me. 108, 146 At. 10
(1929); New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Blacker, 178 Mass. 386, 59 N. E. 1020
(1901); In re Pier Old No. 49, East River, 227 N. Y. 119, 124 N. E. 148 (1919);
First Construction Co. v. State, 221 N. Y. 295, 116 N. E. 1021 (1917); Brainerd v.
State of New York, 74 Misc. 100, 131 N. Y. S. 221 (Ct. Cl. 1911); Shipley v.
Pittsburg, C. & W. R. Co., 216 Pa. 512, 65 Atl. 1094 (1907); West Chester & W.
Plank-Road Co. v. Chester County, 182 Pa. 40, 37 Atl. 905 (1897). Cf. Spokane Falls
etc. v. Ziegler, 167 U. S. 65, 17 Sup. Ct. 728 (1897) : Oakland Club v. South Carolina
Public Service A., 110 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), United States v. 202 Acres
of Land, 51 F. Supp. 56 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); United States v. Big Bend Transit Co.,
42 F. Supp. 459, 474-475 (E. D. Wash. 1941); City of St. Louis v. Smith, 325 Mo.
471, 30 S. W. (2d) 729 (1930) ; Miller v. Huntington & Ohio Bridge Co., 123 W. Va.
320, 342, 15 S. E. (2d) 687, 700 (1941). See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1936) § 53.
44185 Mass. 190, 192, 69 N. E. 1051, 1052 (1904).
45
-Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 135 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 9th,
1943), cert den., (1943) 12 U. S. L. WERK 3114.
46The Powelson case was relied upon by the Government in opposing a petition for
certiorari in the Washington' Water Power case, ibid.

STUDENT NOTES
Bankruptcy: Partnerships: Whether "entity" or "aggregate" theory
should prevail in partnership bankruptcy proceedings.-In the recent
case of Masan v. Mitchell, 135 F. (2d) 599 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) the circuit
court was asked to decide under which theory, "entity" or "aggregate," a partnership's solvency should be determined for the purposes of bankruptcy.
Appellant had filed a petition under the Bankruptcy Act' seeking a voluntary
adjudication of an alleged partnership between herself and defendant. Defendant objected, asserting his own solvency. The court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of plaintiff's petition and upheld the defendant on the ground
that a partnership is not insolvent so long as any one of the members who
compose it is solvent in the sense of being able to pay both his individual
and the firm debts. The court thus concluded that personal solvency may be
raised by a nonassenting partner as a good defense to a petition filed on
behalf of the partnership by another partner.
The conclusion here reached can be supported only by acceptance of the
"aggregate" theory, and is in accord with the position taken by the overwhelming weight of authority. 2 But whether this is presently the view of the
Supreme Court since its decision in Liberty National Bank v. Bear is open
to doubt. Previously the. strong dicta of Justice Holmes in the leading case
4
of Francis v. McNeil clearly committed the high Court to support the
"aggregate" theory. But the more recent Liberty Bank decision, although
5

claiming itself to be "not in conflict with the decision in Francisv. McNeil,"
has been viewed by some commentators, among whom is the draftsman of
6
the present partnership bankruptcy section, as an adoption of the "entity"
view. 7 A few writers have attempted to reconcile the two cases by limiting

130

SrAT. 547 (1898), as amended, 52 STAT. 845 (1938), 11 U. S' C. § 23 (1940).
Francis v. McNeil, 228 U. S. 695, 699-701, 33 Sup. Ct. 701, 702 (1913); Meek v.
Beezer, 28 F. (2d) 343, 347 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928), cert. den., 278 U. S. 651, 49 Sup. Ct.
177 (1929) ; In re Fuller, 9 F. (2d) 553, 554 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) ; Baker v. BatesStreet Shirt Co., 6 F. (2d) 854, 858 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925); Vaccaro v. Security Bank,
103 Fed. 436 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900) ; In re Perlhefter, 177 Fed. 299 (S. D. N. Y. 1910);
In re Forbes, 128 Fed. J37 (D. Mass. 1904). See CRAM, PARTNERSHIPS (1938) 399;
COLLmR, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) 678; Cook, Partnershipsin Bankruptcy (1930) 15
ST. Louis L. R v. 209, 211; Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 908, 910, 915; Notes (1929)
29 COL. L. Rlv. 1134, 1136; (1928) 14 ST. Louis L. Rlv. 57, 62; (1924) 37 HARy. L.
REv. 614. Contra: In re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907). This case is
generally considered to have been upset by the Francis decision, supra. Comment (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 908, 915, 925; Cook, op. cit. supra, at 211. The very judge who wrote the
Bertenshaw decision expressly recognized in a later case that the Bertenshaw case was
no longer law. Armstrong v. Fisher, 224 Fed. 97, 99 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) ; cf. Armstrong
v. Norris, 247 Fed. 253 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
- 8276 U. S. 215, 48 Sup. Ct. 252 (1927).
4228 U. S. 695, 33 Sup. Ct. 701 (1913).
5276 U. S. at 225, 48 Sup. Ct. 252, 255.
6
See McLaughlin,' Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act (1937)
4 U. OF CHL L. RFv. 369, 378.
71 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. 1940) § 5.03; Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. 3.
2

908, 923.
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their application to the narrow issues of each case. 8 But most writers are confused as to whether the Supreme Court in the Liberty Bank case intended to
upset the great weight of authority favoring the "aggregate" view 9 and adopt
the "entity" view, or whether the highest Court felt, as do some writers, 10
that an adequate system of bankruptcy involves adoption of both theories for
different purposes." If only to resolve this confusion, the Supreme Court
should take certiorari in the principal case, and write a 'lucid decision on all
issues involved in partnership bankruptcy proceedings.
As a matter of law, neither the "entity" nor the "aggregate" theory seems
to have any more or less justification than the other. Starting by assuming
either one of them correct, one can develop a perfectly logical argument
which will run smoothly to its conclusion. If, as under the "aggregate" theory,
you consider the partnership as being nothing more than the aggregate of
the individual members thereof, it is ridiculous to talk about discharging
the partnership in the bankruptcy proceedings of the partnership while not
discharging the partners, and even more ridiculous to talk about the partnership being insolvent while any of the partners are solvent and able to pay
the partnership debts out of their own personal assets.12 If, on the other
band, you conceive of the partnership as a separate entity, 18 with its own
distinct pile of assets and its own list of liabilities, it is perfectly logical to
argue that the partnership may become insolvent in its own right, even though
the partners themselves, or some of them are still personally solvent; and that
payment of the firm's debts by the partners out of their personal assets
does not make the firm any more solvent, even as payment by a surety' 4 of
his principal's debt does not make the principal any more solvent, although
relieving the principal of his obligation to the creditor.' 5 This analogy that
and
approximates the relation of the partner and his firm to that of a surety
17
his principal is an appealing one ;16 but it must be used with caution.
8
See Cook, op. cit. snpra n. 2, at 213; Note (1928) 14 ST. Louis L. REv. 57. In the
Francis case the narrow issue in point was whether the individual estate of a nonadjudicated, partner could be drawn into the administration of a bankrupt firm; in the
Liberty Bank case the issue was whether a court order adjudging a firm bankrupt has
the9 automatic effect of adjudging non-adjudicated partners bankrupt.
• Francis v. McNeil, 228 U. S. 695, 33 Sup. Ct. 701 (1913) ; cf. Lurie v. United States,
20 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927). See Comment (1938) 87 U. O, PA. L. REV. 105,
109;0 Notes (1928) 41 HARV. L. REV. 1044; (1914) 12 MICH. L. REV. 223, 224.
1 Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 908, 910, 911.

"Notes
2

(1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REV. 179, 180; (1928) 14 ST. Louis L. REv. 57, 62.

1 For this argument, see Holmes, J. in the Francis case, supra.
13 For a good discussion of the "entity" theory, see WARREN, CORPORATE

ADVANTAGES

WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929) 29 et seq.; Drake, Partership.Entity,and Tenancy in

Partnrship (1917) 15 MIcE. L. REv. 609. For strongest case support of "entity" theory,
see 4In re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), now overruled. See note 2 mtpra.
1 The term "surety" is here used in the broad sense and includes guarantors. Cf. IESTATEMENT, SECUITIES (1941) § 82, comment g; see ARANT, Su, TY SHI"P (1931)

§§4,5 5.

1 For case where counsel argued, unsuccessfully, that partners were like sureties, see
Nashville Saddlery Co. v. Green, 127 Miss. 98, 89 So. 816 (1921), 1wted in (1922)
22 COL. L. REv. 348, 350.
1in several ways partners resemble sureties: like a surety, partners are personally
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Which theory, "entity" or "aggregate," is to prevail? Or if, as has
been suggested supra,' 8 neither is adequate to the absolute exclusion of
the other, to what extent should each prevail? The answer unfortunately
is not to be found in the statute books; for the policy behind the much
criticized' 9 statute20 is not clear. 2' The draftsman of the present partnership bankruptcy section stated his intention to be not to depart, so far as
possible, 22 from the fundamental principles of the "entity" theory,23 which
theory is generally admitted to have been adopted originally by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.24 But Holmes opined, 25 and many legal writers agree
with him, 26 that the partnership section of the Bankruptcy Act was not aimed
at changing fundamental principles of the substantive law of partnerships
based on the "aggregate" theory, and that the basic assumption of the Act
of 1898 was that whenever the partnership was administered in bankruptcy,
liable for the debts of their principal (or firm) ; like a surety, the partner's liability
is often considered as secondary; also like a surety, the partners are not discharged

by the discharge of their firm in bankruptcy; and like a surety, the partner who pays his

firm's debts is subrogated against or indemnified by his firm or co-sureties (i.e., fellowpartners).
'7 The approximation of a surety to a partner is only an analogy, not an identity:
whereas a partner has an actual interest in the partnership, which, in the case of a profitable business, is a personal asset which could have been attached at common law [see
CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS (1938) 156] to satisfy personal judgments [but see UNIFORM
PAITNERSEn, AcT §§ 25(2), 28, under which "charging orders" are now issued against
the partner's interest in the business instead of writs of attachment and execution], the

surety has no such interest in his principal's capital; whereas the assets of the partnership

and those of the partners are so merged that the assets of the firm are in reality the
'aggregate of the undivided shares of the partners, the assets of the principal and his
surety are exclusive of one another; whereas the right of the partnership creditor to go
against the individual partners personally to obtain satisfaction exists because of the
very relation of the partners to the business which gives rise to a relational obligation,
the right of the creditors to sue the surety arises because of the surety's contractual obligation; unlike a surety, a partner is not released from his obligations by an extension
of time granted to his firm in the payment of its debts [for case on release of surety,
see Zastrow v. Knight, 56 S. D. 554, 229 N. W. 925 (1930) ; accord: Murray v. Marshall, 94 N. Y. 611 (1884)] or by a change of obligee [see ARANT, SuRmrysmp (1931)
268]; whereas the principal element of suretyship is liability for the obligations of
another, such liability is a mere incident of the partnership relation, the principal element
of which is the right to participate in the management and share in the profits.
I 89 See note 10 and text supra.
1 For criticism of partnership section of Chandler Act, see generally Comments (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 908, (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 105.
2030 STAT. 547 (1898), as amended, 52 STAT. 845 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 23 (1940).
21
See Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rav. 1044, 1046.
22
For recognition by McLaughlin that adoption of "entity" theory was not possible
for23all purposes, see Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 21.
bd.
I
24
Hough, Some New Aspects of PartntershipBankruptcy Under thw Act of 1898 (1908)
S COL. L. REv. 599; Comment (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REV. 105. The "entity" theory
-was first announced in Chemical Bank v. Meyer, 92 Fed. 896 (E. D. N. Y. 1899). Note
(1912)
10 MIcH. L. REv. 215.
25
Francis v. McNeil, supra, at 700, 33 Sup. Ct. at 702.
26
Note (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 1134, 1137.
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the partners would also be declared bankrupt, provided this was feasible.2 7
Holmes' contention seems borne out by the fact that one section of the Bankruptcy Act, although impliedly inapplicable to partnership bankruptcy proceedings, 28 provides that in determining whether a partnership isinsolvent
the separate assets of the partners are to be considered. 29
A casual reading of the partnership bankruptcy section of the Act seems
to indicate adoption by Congress of the "entity" theory.3 0 The effect of subsection a l is t6 allow a partnership to be adjudged bankrupt even though its
partners are not so adjudged. This provision, if interpreted literally, completely reverses the substantive law of partnerships as it had existed under
the Bankruptcy 'Act of 1867,32 whereby a partnership could not be administered in bankruptcy without an adjudication of all the partners. Congress'
reasons for effecting such a change in the law, if that was its purpose, are
not clear.33 While many have assumed that subsection a was intended to
effect a substantive change in the law,3 4 others have suggested that the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 intended "to preserve, not to upset, existing relations,"3 5
and that thus subsection a has mere procedural significance,3 6 being designed
primarily to overcome the unusual situation where personal exemption to
bankruptcy proceedings of some of the partners due to infancy,37 insanity,3 8
death,39 or their status as farmers or wage-earners, 40 etc. might otherwise
prevent the firm from ever being adjudged bankrupt involuntarily.
27
For instances where this is not feasible, see text infra p. 247.
28
The effectiveness of the provision is expressly limited in application to the section
wherein
it is found, dealing with fraudulent transfers.
29
NATIoNAL

BANKRUPTCY,

Acr § 67 d(l), 52

STAT.

877 (1938), 11 U. S. C.

§ 107 d(l) (1940).
It is noteworthy that the Commissioners on the Uniform Partnership Act expressly
directed the draftsman not to proceed on the basis that a partnership is a legal
person.
Lewis, The Uniform PdrtnershipAct (1915) 29 H~Av. L. Rlv. 158, 173.
30
Note (1912) 10 MicH. L. REv. 215, 219.
3152 STAT. 845 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 23a (1940).
32Rv. STAT. § 5121 (1875).
See In re Ceballos & Co., 161 Fed. 451, 452 (D. N. J.
1908) ; It re Meyer, 98 Fed. 976, 979 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899) ; Comment (1940) 49 YALE
L 33J. 908.
Congress' purpose may have been to spare partners the "stigma" of bankruptcy,
wherever possible. But, for argument that bankruptcy should be considered a remedy,
not a "stigma," see McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy
Act (1937) 4 U. OF CHi. L. Rtv. 369, 373.
It is more likely that Congress sought to make it more easy for creditors to throw
a partnership into bankruptcy, without worrying about some partners as to whom
jurisdiction could not be obtained. See text infra p. 250.
34
Supra note 22.
35
Francis v. McNeil, srupra, at 700, 33 Sup. Ct. at 702.
3
6See Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rav. 1044, 1046. '
STn
re Duguid, 100 Fed. 274 (E. D. N. C. 1900).
38
11 re L. Stein & Co., 127 Fed. 547 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904).
3
409In re Wells, 298 Fed. 109 (S.D. Ohio, 1924).
Dickas v. Barnes, 140 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) (held, a partnership [not engaged in farming], some of whose members are farmers or wage-earners personally
exempt by statute from adjudication as involuntary bankrupts, may nonetheless be
adjudicated an involuntary bankrupt firm. Cf. H. D. Still's Sons v. American Nat'l Bank,
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It is clear Justice Holme' thought, even in view of subsection a, that,
wherever possible, as a matter of policy "the partners ought to be put into
41
The language of the Act does not
bankruptcy whenever the firm is."'
preclude this construction.
Subsection g,42 in denying to npn-adjudicated partners a discharge from
their partnership obligations as an automatic consequence of the adjudication of the firm, despite the fact that even the non-adjudicated partners' personal assets may be drawn into the administration of the bankrupt partnership, can not be read otherwise than as a restatement of the "entity" theory.
This subsection has been universally criticized. 43 It has been called an "incongruity" 4" and a mere "futility" 45 to leave the partners liable while discharging
the imaginary partnership entity. Aside from the fact that the discharge of
the partnership has no practical effect, 46 it is inequitable to subject the nonadjudicated partners to the burdens of administration of their personal assets
in bankruptcy, without granting them the benefits, principally a discharge, at
least so far as their individual liability for partnership obligations is concerned. 47
The draftsman of the present partnership bankruptcy section, in justifying
his inclusion of subsection g in the Act, claims that it is ".... merely declaratory of existing" and "settled law." 48 But legal commentators have taken
issue with this. 49 It-is claimed that prior to the Chandler Act the cases, far
from being "settled," were in "irreconciliable conflict." 50 Viewed in this light,
it becomes questionable whether the Chandler Act may be taken as an intentional adoption of the "entity" theory for purposes of the discharge of
partners, or rather as merely an erroneous codification of the cases.
et al. 209 Fed. 749 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913), criticized in Note (1914) 12 MICH. L. Rv.
483, 484, holding that a partnership chiefly engaged in a farming business could not be
adjudicated a bankrupt.
It has been held that the estate of a partner chiefly engaged in an exempt occupation
may nonetheless be administered in the bankruptcy proceedings of his firm, under the
rule of the Francis case, supra. In re Duke & Son, 199 Fed. 199 (N. D. Ga. 1912), ntoted
11 MicH. L. REv.246.
(1913)
41
Francis v. McNeil, supra, at 701, 33 Sup. Ct. at 703.
4252 STAT. 846 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 23g (1940).
43
See generally, Comments (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 908, 924; (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L.
REv.
105, 112.
44
Holmes, J. in Francis v. McNeil, supra, at 701, 33 Sup. Ct. at 703.
45
Note (1927) 5 TEx. L. REv. 400, 402.
46
Hough, op. cit. supra n. 24, at 603.
47
Supra note 43; see Cook, op. cit. supra n. 2, at, 221; Notes (1926) 35 YALE L. J.
362;
(1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 348, 349.
48
Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 26-27.
49
See note 43 supra.
50 Cook, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 221.
Cases granting a discharge: Bear v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 285 Fed. 703 (C. C. A. 4th,
1922), aff'd on awther ground, 265 U. S. 365, 44 Sup. Ct. 499 (1924) ; In re Forbes,
128 Fed. 137 (D. M~ss. 1904) ; Abbott v. Anderson, 265 Ill. 285, 106 N. E. 782 (1914).
Cases denying a discharge: It re Sugar Valley Gin Co., 292 Fed. 508 (D. Ga. 1923);
Homer v. Hamner, 249 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918) ;- In, re Bertenshaw', 157 Fed.
1
363 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907).
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The second sentence of subsection i51 could conceivably, although erroneously, be read to support the "aggregate" theory. It provides, in effect, that
where less than all of the general partners are adjudged bankrupt, the partnership shall not be administered in bankruptcy. If read literally, this clause,
by precluding a firm from ever being adjudged bankrupt unless all its partners are personally bankrupt, would vitiate the effect of subsection a, which
allows a partnership to be administered in bankruptcy irrespective of its partners. But courts, in adjudging firms bankrupt even though less than all
their partners are personally bankrupt,5 2 have correctly construed this clause
as if it had been worded that the partnership need not, rather than shall not,
be adjudged bankrupt where less than all the partners are bankrupt, unless
the firm is itself vulnerable to a bankruptcy petition.
The first sentence of subsection i ig unquestionably inconsistent with the
"entity" doctrine, in holding that where all the paitners are adjudged bankrupt, the partnership shall also be so adjudged. To be consistent with the
"entity" theory the legislature would have to stipulate that regardless of what
happens to the partners, the partnership, being a separate entity, need not be
adjudged bankrupt unless it is itself insolvent. Wisely the legislature did
not so hold. Irrespective of which theory one espouses, there can be no doubt
that compelling practical considerations make it imperative that when all the
partners are personally before
53 a bankruptcy court, the firm should also be
administered in bankruptcy.
It is submitted that it is just such practical considerations as this and others
to be mentioned, rather than legal considerations, which indicate the superiority, as a matter of substantive law, of the "aggregate" over the "entity"
theory for all phases of partnership bankruptcy.
The main purposes of the bankruptcy acts were originally tQ aid creditors,C4 and later also to give relief to insolvent debtors. 55 But bankruptcy was
never intended as a device with which to dissolve businesses. If, pursuant
to the "entity" view, a court allows a petition to be filed against a partnership among whose members some,, at least, are solvent, the only material
effect of the proceeding is the dissolution of the partnership, while its "soul
keeps marching on"--that is, its debts linger on to haunt the solvent partners. But neither of the aforementioned purposes of bankruptcy is accomplished as a result of the granting of the petition.
Creditors probably would not even file a petition against a firm while any
of its partners remains personally able to satisfy all its obligations. Presumably a creditor's primary concern is the receipt of prompt payments. So long
as any of the members of the partnership remains able to pay all of its debts,
5152

STAT. -46 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 23i (1940).
52E.g., see Marnet Oil & Gas Co. v. Staley, 218 Fed.

45 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914) ; Tate v.

Brinser,
226 Fed. 878 (M. D. Pa. 1915).
53
54

See Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 908, 918.
FINLETTER, THE- LAW oF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION

(1939)

20.

GuId. at 20-24; see McLaughlin, op. cit. supra n. 6; Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. 3.
908, 926. See also New York Inst. for Deaf and Dumb v. Crockett, 117 App. Div. 269,

102 N. Y. Supp. 412 (1907).
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a creditor, having the power to bring an action against such solvent partners
for payment of partnership obligations, would have no reason to petition to
have the partnership put into bankruptcy. 5 6 Of course, if the creditor is more
desirous of putting the firm into bankruptcy for some personal reason than
he is desirous of collecting the debt owing to him, as where the creditor is
also a competitor, he is more likely to want to file a petition against a firm
which is insolvent only in the "entity" sense, without his having to worry
about "dead, insane, absent, dormant, or secret partners" who may be
solvent. 577 But bankruptcy laws are not the instrument of such personal
desires. a
As to providing relief to debtors, the Bankruptcy Act as it stands affords
no relief to the true debtors of the partnership. The true debtors of an insolvent firm are, of course, the non-adjudicated partners, not the fictional
partnership entity. To discharge a debtor partnership from obligations which,
as a matter of fact, it could not have paid anyhow, while leaving the vulnerable solvent partners fully liable for all partnership obligations, is a mere
nullity.
With regard to the so-called quasi-involuntary 58 petition which the Act59
allows to be filed provided the "partnership is insolvent," where less than all
of the partners desire to put the firm into bankruptcy, there is no practical
reason to entertain the "entity" interpretation of partnership insolvency.
Solvent partners are unlikely to file such a petition as they stand bnly to lose
by it: (1) Their business investment loses its "going-concern" value; (2) their
personal assets are likely to be taken to pay partnership debts.60 Insolvent
partners should not be allowed unnecessarily to jeopardize the solvent partners' interests by filing a quasi-involuntary petition, especially since insolvent
partners, who can always obtain a discharge from their partnership obligations by going into individual bankruptcy, do not benefit thereby.
In requiring that the partnership be insolvent before allowing a quasiinvoluntary petition to be filed, Congress presumably sought to protect the
non-consenting partners, since insolvency is not a prerequisite where all the
56

True, it is to the advantage of holders of contingent claims against the partnership
to force the partnership into bankruptcy as soon as possible where there is a likelihood
that the partners, though presently solvent, may not be able to personally satisfy these
claims when they mature. But this in itself would not appear to justify the allowance
of an involuntary petition to be filed against the partnership.
57Hough,
op. cit. stpra.n. 24, at 604.
5T
See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Smith-Cole, Inc., et al., 62 F. (2d) 972, 974 (C. C. A. 10th,
1933) (where a petition is filed for no other reason than in pursuance of petitioner's
business policy to participate in no liquidation proceeding except bankruptcy, held, the
should be dismissed).
action
5
sFor this usage of the term "quasi-involuntary," see Analysis of H. R. 12889, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 23. The petition is considered so far voluntary as to obviate
the necessity of an act of bankruptcy as a prerequisite to filing a petition, but so far
involuntary as to necessitate proof of insolvency. A petition filed by some partners and
objected to by others could hardly be 'called voluntary.
5952 STAT. 845'(1938), 11 U. S. C. § 23b (1940).
6ONote ,(1925) 4 TEX. L Rav. 102, 105.
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partners consent to the petition. If this protection is to be more than nominal,
the non-consenting partners should be enabled to defeat the petition by showing their ability and willingness to pay all the firm's debts.
As a matter of fact, solvent, non-consenting partners can always 'avoid
insolvency if they so desire, even under the "entity" construction, by pouring
more of their personal assets into the business. Thus, since the "entity"
construction can be easily rendered ineffectual, here again practicability
demands the prevalence of the "aggregate" theory.
In conclusion, it seems clear that neither the "aggregate" nor the "entity"
theory can prevail to the absolute exclusion of the other. The firm must be
treated as an entity for the purposes of the long-established rule of distribution under the doctrine of "marshalling of the assets," entitling firm creditors
to first claim on firm assets. 61 The Supreme Court's Liberty Bank decision,
supra, makes it clear that a firm is also to be treated as an entity to the
extent that a court decree adjudging the firm bankrupt shall not have, the
automatic effect .of adjudging any of the non-adjudicated partners bankrupt.
62
But a firm can not be effectively dealt with as an entity for all purposes.
In the Francis case, supra, the Supreme Court clearly held that the "aggregate" theory is to be applied so as to allow a non-adjudicated partner's
assets to be drawn into the administration of the bankrupt partnership.
Between these two great Supreme Court decisions lies a gap which must be
closed by the Court in a third decision as yet unwritten. As a matter of
policy, should the partners be adjudged bankrupt whenever possible in a
decree 'concurrent with the one so adjudging their firm? -Do the partners'
individual assets count in computing the solvency of the firm? And what
effect is to be given to the much-discredited section of -the Chandler Act63
which withholds from the non-adjudicated partners of a bankrupt firm a
discharge from individual liability on partnership obligations? The answers
to these cfuestions form the substance which is to fill in the gap in the law.
Upon one of these answers, at least, hinges the correctness of the circuit
court's decision in the principal case.
Alvin D. Lurie
Business Regulation: Federal anti-trust laws: Recent applications to
co5 perative organizations.-In recent years the necessities of a changing
economy, especially in the field of production of food supplies, have paved
the way for the growth and, development of cooperative organizations. For
this brief survey it will suffice to sketch the broad- outlines of this evolution.'
6152 STAT. 846 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 23 g (1940). See Shroder, Distrbution of Assets
of Bankrupt Partnerships and Partners (1905) 18 HARv. L. REv. 495. See also United
States
62 v. Kaufman, 267 U. S. 408, 45 Sup. Ct. 322 (1925).
Analysis. of H. R. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 21; Comment (1940) 49 YALE
L. J. 908, 919; Note (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 1134.
6352 STAT. 846 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 23 g (1940).'

lFor a more comprehensive and detailed history see:

EVANS AND STOrmYK, THE LAW
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The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 18922 made no provision for the exemption
or exclusion of such co6peratives. The judiciary's early applications of the
Act were confined to business trusts and trade associations. 3 Following the
federal pattern, various states enacted anti-monopolistic legislation. In
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company4 the United States Supreme Court
held unconstitutional such a state statute, which excepted from its operation
agricultural and live-stock producer co6peratives on the ground that it contravened the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Subsequently, 5 the Court recognized the power of the states to authorize farmers
to cooperate in marketing their own products, yet distinguished the Connolly
case on the basis of the classification involved. That case was expressly overruled in Tigner v. Texas, 6 where a similar statute was upheld as a proper
exercise of legislative discretion based on the economic
differences between
7
farmer-producers and urban business organizations.
The courts have not been very helpful in defining the limits within which
the activities of cooperatives are legal. Rather, they have indulged in oblique
phraseology--"right to function only when it does so illegally" ;8 "reasonableness and moderation." 9 Congress has not been more enlightening with its
"lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof"' 10 Only from an
examination and correlation of particular cases may an area be delineated;
but case material is, as yet, insufficient to define all the functional aspects
of co6peratives.
OF COPERATIV MARIETING (1937) chaps. I, IV; PACKEL, THE LAW OF THE ORGANIZA:'
TION AND OPERATION OF CO6PERATMIS (1940) chap. X, § 63 et seq.; Hanna, Co~perative

Associations and the Public (1930) 29 MIcH. L. REv. 148; Miller, Farmers' Cooperative
Associations as Legal Combinations (1922) 7 CORNELI L. Q. 293; Ballantine, Coaperative
Marketing Associations (1923) 8 MINN. L. REv. 1; Bunn, Consumers' Coaperativesand
Price Fixing Laws (1941) 40 MIcH. L. REv. 165; Note (1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 674.
226 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1940).
3See Note (1941) 25 MINN. L. REv. 208.

4184 U. S. 540, 22 Sup. Ct. 431 (1901).
5

Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Marketing Associa-

tion, 276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291 (1928).
6310 U. S.141, 60 Sup. Ct. 879 (1940).

7In the recent case of Midland Co~perative Wholesale v. Ickes, 125 F. (2d) 618 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1942) plaintiff, a consumers' wholesale cobperative sought the protection of the
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 [50 STAT. 77 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 833 (i) (13) (1940)]
which provides: "It shall not be an unfair method of competition or a violation of the
code or any requirement of this Act (1) to sell to or through any bona-fide and legitimate farmers' coSperative organization. . . ." The circuit court stated that consumers' cooperatives, as plaintiff, did not fall within the above provision. "Congress had the right
to discriminate between the types of co~peratives and it manifestly did so, and the failure
to treat them alike is neither novel nor unreasonable ....
Laws fostering cobperative
marketing and purchasing by farmers have a common genealogy. They stem from a
desire on the part of federal and state legislators to extend to farmers ways to enable
them to counteract the effects of an increasingly urban economy." 125 F. (2d) at 631.
SMid-West Theatres Co. v. Cobperative Theatres of Michigan, 43 F. Supp. 216, 222
(E. D. Mich. 1941).
9
River Packers Association v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970, 977 (D. Ore. 1939).
1 Columbia
0
CLAYTo AcT, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. 17 (1940).
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May a c66perative of independent consumers so control a market that
an individual be deprived of free competition? This question was posed to
the court in Mid-West Theatres Co. v. Coiperative Theatres of Michigan."
Plaintiff corporation, the owner of four theatres, brought a suit to enjoin
defendant, a cobperative association of about one hundred motion picture
exhibitors, 12 alleging violations of the Sherman and Clayton' 3 Acts which
denied plaintiff the benefits of free competition. In the field of motion
pictures, priority in obtaining films is a distinct financial advantage. Plaintiff
.alleged that defendant, through its widespread control, threatened to boycott
producers if they made films available to competing theatre owners before
dealing with the co6perative: The court did not controvert the legality of
defendant's existence under Michigan law, 14 nor the right to assemble a vast
purchasing power with its concomitant control. It held that when a cooperative employs methods which obstruct the channels of free trade for a
competitor, "then the line has been crossed between legality and illegality."' 5
Can a coalition of producers, in the form of a co6perative, controlling a
substantial portion of the sources of a particular product, require a purchaser of its product to enter into an exclusive buying contract without running afoul of the federal anti-trust laws? Such a co perative enterprise
may provide varied benefits to the public, yet the power to suppress competition and fix prices is the natural outgrowth of this type of contractual relationship. A self-styled "labor union," composed of 90% of the commercial
troll fishermen in Washington and Oregon waters, exacted such "exclusive
contracts" from the processors and packers of marine products in that area.
A requirement was imposed that no purchases were to be made from fishermen not members of the "union." The Columbia River Packers Association,
one of the purchasers, was approached by "independent" fishermen who desired to sell their product. Unable to buy because of its contract with- the
union, and threatened with suits by the independents, the Association brought
an action against the union (1) to enjoin it from interfering with purchases
from non-union members, (2) for a judgment invalidating the "exclusive
clauses", and (3) for treble damages. The court, in Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton,16 enjoined the so-called union, stating that a co1143 F. Supp. 216 (E. D. Mich. 1941).
Theatres in Detroit were classified into first-run, second-run, key-run and succeedingrun houses. Defendant co~perative was comprised of 50% of the seating capacity, exclusive ,of first-run houses, and 76% of key and succeeding-run houses.
1338 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1940).
' 4 "Independent operators may organize for the reasonable promotion of their economic
activity without violation of the Sherman Law. This principle was clearly enunciated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288
U. 5S.344, 53 Sup. Ct. 471 and has been consistently adhered to." 43 F. Supp. at 221.
' 1d. at 223. Though plaintiff showed no damages, yet an injunction was issued, the
court stating, "In any event, a wrong in which the public is interested should not be
permitted to continue and although the right of this court to grant any injunction without
allowing damages may be questioned, we nevertheless decided to err, if at all, upon the
side of what we believe to be fairness and common sense." Id. at 225.
12

16315 U. S. 143, 62 Sup. Ct. 520 (1942), reV'g 117 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941),
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operative cannot exert so monopolistic a control and deprive the consuming
public of the benefits accruing from an unrestricted market. The public
interest is of vital concern in mktters affecting the production and distribution of the necessities of life. Reasonableness and moderation should be the
guide. 17 The anti-trust laws were held to be properly invoked, no labor controversy being involved, for it was a dispute as to the sale of a product rather
than as to terms and conditions of employment.18
Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Industries19 in the Federal District Court,
presented analogous issues. All the boat owners in the Port of Monterey,
California, formed a coperative association and entered into contracts with
the canners in the Port, by the terms of which the canner was not to buy
fish from anyone not a member of the association. A scheme was devised
whereby a price was fixed, although there was no outright, sale. of the
product. Rather, boats were "assigned" to the various canners; but there
was no assurance that the canners' yearly needs would be filled in this manner.
Manaka was an independent fisherman who had contracted with one of the
canners to supply the latter with fish.' He brought a suit against the cooperative alleging a conspiracy to restrain him from fishing and marketing
his own products, and seeking treble damages under the anti-trust laws. The
district court found that these exclusive agreements vested a monopolistic
control of the industry in defendant by restricting the market, and were,
thus, a restraint of "foreign commerce" 20 in violation of the Sherman Act.
It is fallacious to presume that a co6perative organization may dominate a
field of production of life's necessaries with the altruistic intent of conservation of a particular product. The restrictive provisions of the anti-trust laws
still apply, as in the case of any business enterprise, to boycotts, restraints
on competition; and the control of prices. 2 1 It is to be observed that the court
diat not specifically consider the problem of price control in the Manaka case,
but intimated that it was a violatiou of the Sherman Act incidental to the
main issue. This may be because that question had recently been settled in
United States v. Borden Co.,22 where, aside from other statutory consideraand remanding case to 131 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942). See- Note (194,1)

27 VA.

L. Ra v.674, 683.

17Predicated on the "rule of reason" developedin.StandardOil Co. v. United States, 221
U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, Ann Cas. 1912D 734, n. 764 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S.106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (1911).
18 See 315 U. S.143, 62 Sup. Ct. 520 (1942).
1941 F. Supp. 531 (N. D. Calif. 1941).
20"Foreign commerce" was involved, for the ships that left the Port of Monterey intermingled with vessels of other nations on the high seas where they caught the marine
which they brought into the State of California.
products
2
'United States v. King, 250 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916). Dealers in potatoes formed

the Aroostook Potato Shippers' Association and blacklisted "undesirables." The list was
circulated among members and non-members; held, No protection is afforded by § 6
of the Clayton Act. The association is not permitted to adopt a secondary boycott or
other measures which are not available to other lawful organizations.
22308 U. S.188, 60 Sup. Ct. 182 (1939), rev'g in part 28 F. Supp. 177 (1939) (to be
considered subsequently in detail).
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tions, hereafter to be discussed, the Supreme Court of the United States had
held it to be contrary to the limitations of the anti-trust laws to form a cooperative organization and then conspire to fix and maintain an artificial
price upon a necessary commodity.
That Congress has approved the co6perative form of business organization is manifest in its various legislative declarations. 23 What qualifications
these statutes have imposed upon the provisions of the federal anti-trust
laws can be observed only by an examination of their judicial construction.
In 1914, the Clayton Act 24 authorized the formation of agricultural and
horticultural non-profit organizations, not having capital stock and operated
for the mutual benefit of members. The Capper-Volstead Act of 192225 extended such recognition to those co~peratives operating with "capital stock,"
and further provided for the intervention by the Secretary of Agriculture
if there is a monopolization or an undue enhancement of prices.2 6 The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 laid down an elaborate plan for
marketing agreements 27 and orders 28 under the direction of the Secretary of
Agriculture.
It is a serious error to assume that by these statutes Congress intended to
wrest from the judicial field the control of the enforcement of the federal
anti-trust laws as to the production and marketing of agricultural and other
commodities, and vest an administrative officer with exclusive quasi-judicial
powers of such wide scope. The authority of the Secretary of Agriculture
under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act is restricted by express
provisions, for his is a limited, not an exclusive, jurisdiction. He is empowered to deal with certain commodities only.29
In United States v. Borden Co.30 an indictment charged producers, distributors, a labor union, city officials and certain individuals with a conspiracy to fix and maintain arbitrary prices and restrain trade in the production, transportation and distribution of fluid milk in the Chicago area in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, The producers of milk had formed
a co~perative organization through which they marketed their product. The
2

3E.g., CLAYTON ACT, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 8 et seq. (1940); CAPPERVOLSTEAD ACT, 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. §§ 291, 292 (1940); FEDERAL CO6PERATIVE MARKETING Acr, 44 STAT. 802 (1926), 7 U. S. C. § 451 et seq. (1940) ; API'ROPREATIONs ACT (appropriation made for enforcement of anti-trust statutes, exempting agricultural co~peratives) 44 STAT. 330, 343 (1926); AGRICULTURAL MARCETING ACT, 46
STAT. 11 (1929), 12 U. S. C. § 1141 et seq. (1940) ; FARM CREDIT AcT, 48 STAT. 257
(1933), 12 U. S. C. § 1131 et seq. (1940) ; FIsHERmEN'S COLLEcTIVE MARKETING ACT,
48 STAT. 1213 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §§ 521, 522 (1940) ; AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AGREEMENT ACT, 50 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. § 601 et seq. (1940).

2

4See note 13 supra.
U. S. C. § 291 (1940).
8id. at § 292.
2750 STAT. 246 (1937), 7 U. S. C. § 608b (1940).
2
ld. at § 608c.
29Id. at 608c (2).
30308 U. S. 188, 60 Sup. Ct. 182, rezg in part 28 F. (2d) 177 (1939); see Notes
(1939) 34 ILL. L. REV. 345, (1941) 27 VA. L. REv. 674, 680. Cf. Barnes v. Dairymen's
2542 STAT. 388 (1922), 7
2
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district court dismissed the indictment stating that the Capper-Volstead
Act gave authority to producers to organize and fix and control prices in
marketing and that intervention was solely at the instigation of the Secretary of Agriculture, and then only when such practices unduly enhanced the
price of a particular commodity; that the producers were also protected by
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act because it removed co6perative
organizations entirely from the purview of the Sherman Act. The United
States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that these statutes have not
superseded the restrictions of the Sherman Act. Under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act, the Secretary of Agriculture must follow a dictated procedure, and in the absence of his action, the marketing of agricultural commodities is not removed from the policing powers of the Sherman
Act. The latter is a broad statute controlling monopolies arid attempts to
monopolize, as well as restraints which burden interstate commerce. Where,
however, the Secretary of Agriculture has undertaken to act, and has entered into agreements or issued an order in respect to a particular commodity, the Sherman Act is not violated though the effect of such action is
to give a co6perative a monopoly of the market.3
The Supreme Court said that the Capper-Volstead Act did authorize cooperative organizations to market collectively and make necessary contracts.
Yet, rfo justification is found in the Act to allow such cooperatives to conspire with others to fix prices, when such conspiracies are outlawed by
the Sherman Act. Again the Court pointed out the limited procedure-which
obtains when the Secretary of Agriculture seeks to intervene. Similarly in
the later Hinton case, discussed above, 32 the union endeavored to invoke the
protection of the Fishermen's Collective Marketing Act, 33 which was patterned after the Capper-Volstead Act. The court there, relying on the Borden
case, denied that protection, stating that the procedure by the Secretary of
Commerce is not exclusive where a monopolistic practice has arisen. And
in the Manaka case3 4 it was held that inaction by the Secretary of Commerce
is no indication that a monopoly does not exist in violation of the anti-trust
laws. It thus appears that what at first glance seemed unlimited legislative
sanction of co6perative activity has been narrowly limited by judicial construction. The extra-judicial powers conferred upon administrative officers
League Co6perative Association, Inc., 220 App. Div. 624, 22 N. Y. Supp. 294 ,(1927).
But see the recent case of United States v. Dairy Co-operative Association, 49 F. Supp.
475 (D. Ore. 1943). Defendant co~perative and others were indicted for violation of the
federal anti-trust laws. Defendants' motion of not guilty was allowed, the district court
stating that although the acts of the co~perative were monopolistic in character, Congress, in the Clayton Act, said such action was not punishable criminally.
31
See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U. S. 533, 560, 59 Sup. Ct. 993, 1006
(1939), where it was said, "If ulterior motives of corporate aggrandizement stimulated
their activities, their efforts were not thereby rendered unlawful. If the Act and Order
are otherwise valid, the fact that their effect would be to give'co~peratives a monopoly
of 32the market would not violate the Sherman Act. .. .
See note 15 supra
348 STAT. 1213, 1214 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §§ 521, 522 (1940).
3
4See note 18 supra.
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must be exercised in the prescribed manner. In the absence of such official
participation, cobperatives, in their marketing practices, are still subject to
the anti-trust laws.
What relief is afforded co~perative organizations under the federal antitrust laws? In Farnmrs Coidperative Oil Co. v. Socony-Vaciaim Oil Co.,
Inc., et al.3 r plaintiff co5perative, a distributors' association existing and
operating under Iowa law,3 6 brought an action for treble damages under the
Clayton Act 3 7 aga,,inst eight corporations which had been convicted of a conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.38 The court did not deny the cooperative the right to sue, but did deny it the right to prosecute the action
as a class suit under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3 9 It was held
that the co6perative had erred in failing to set forth its individual cause of
action and the separate causes of action of each of its members, and remanded the case for amendment of the complaint to that effect. 40 Louisiana
Farmers"Protective Union v. Great A & P Tea Co. 41 raised a similar procedural problem. There the plaintiff was a non-profit cobperative organization
composed of all the strawberry growers in the State of Louisiana. The cooperative, to which all the members had assigned their individual causes of
action, brought an action for treble damages, to an amount over eight
million dollars, under the Sherman Act, 42 and alleged a conspiracy by the
defendants to stifle all competition and to monopolize the retail distribution
of strawberries in interstate commerce. The district court dismissed the
action, without leave to plaintiff to amend, and without deciding whether a
conspiracy existed, on the ground that the necessary causal relation was not
shown, and the damages were incapable of arithmetical calculation. The circuit court held this to be error and reversed, allowing plaintiff to amend by
setting forth the damages of each member and the basis of computation.
These two cases show the dire need for a new procedure in litigation by cooperative organizations, as no statute exists at present which allows a cooperative to sue in its co6perative character for the benefit of its members as
a group.

We have seen that the functions of private co6perative associations are
still subject to the federal anti-trust laws. But what of a state which adopts
a stabilization program to restrict competition and control prices in connecF. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
35133
3
6IowA CoDE (1939) chaps. 389, 390.1.
3738
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1940).
38
See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct. 811 (1939).
Treble damages allowed under 15 U. S. C. § 15: (1) State may sue, State of Georgia v.
Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 62 Sup. Ct. 972 (1942) ; (2) the United States may not, United
States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U. S. 600, 61 Sup. Ct. 742 (1940). See Note (1940)
3539ILL. L. Rv. 223.
Rule 23 (a) (3).

40

Amendment to conform to Rule 20 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing for permissive joinders.
41131 F. (2d) 419 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
4226 STAT. 209 (1890), 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 15 (1940).
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tion with the distribution of agricultural commodities produced within the
state, all of which is denied to private co6perative enterprise? Is it to be
bound by the Sherman Act or the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act?
California adopted an Agricultural Prorate Act for the marketing of raisins,
vesing in various state officials the authority to enforce the Act and program
adopted pursuant thereto. In one case arising under the Act, Brown, a producer and packer of raisins in the state, brought a suit to enjoin the officers
from enforcing the program as to him, and sued for treble damages. The
district court awarded an injunction and held that the program was an undue
burden upon interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of the United States,
in Parkerv. Brown,43 reversed, and in denying relief to the plaintiff declared

that nothing in the Sherman Act or its history indicates that the Act was intended to restrain activity directed by a state, or state action itself. The
Prorate Act, initiated by the California legislature, was never intended to
operate through individual activity, in which instance, presumptively, it would
be illegal. Rather, it was to be effected by the action of state offiicals, acting
under authority delegated by the state. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act becomes effective only when the Secretary of Agriculture inaugurates a marketing program under it. Nothing in the Act, directly or by
implication, indicates 'that a state program may not be enforced until the
Secretary acts, if it be not at variance with the policy of the Act.
The federal anti-trust laws promulgated a policy for the protection of the
freedom of economic intercourse by restraining monopolistic tendencies. In
the absence of statutes, co6peratives are not a privileged form of organization
and still must operate under those laws the same as any other form of business. In the field of the production and marketing of agricultural commodities, the ban has been lifted by statutory authority providing for the participation of government officers. Yet, tbat is a limited freedom, requiring strict
adherence to the letter of the law, and then applicability 'of a particular
statute lies withifi the discretion of the designated officials. Concededly,
the long-established anti-monopolistic standards should be maintained, and
although the courts should be liberal in giving effect to the peculiar advantages of co6perative economic enterprise, yet it is primarily a legislative
function to extend the scope of this new commercialism.
Lillian I. Kaminsky

Executors and Administrators: Liability for priorit of claim of United
States: Methods of presentation.-In United States v. Pate, 47 F. Supp.
965 (D. C. W. D. Ark. 1942) the Federal Government sued the defendant
as administrator of an estate for failure to prefer and pay a claim of the
Federal Housing Administration based upon a promissory note of the defend43317 U. S. 341, 63 Sup. Ct. 307 (195), rezig Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S. D.
Calif. 1941). See Lowenstein v. Evang, 69 Fed. 908 (1895) ;'Note (1942) 41 MicH. L.
REv. 968.
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ant's decedent. Upon the death of the decedent the United States, through its
attorney, filed a verified claim with the clerk of the Probate Court of Howard
County, Arkansas. The claim was presented to the defendant who approved
it in full; upon advice of his attorney, he classified, it as a third class claim.'
It was presented to the probate court and allowed as a third class claim., Although the defendant gave notice to the plaintiff, no appeal was taken from
the judgment. Distribution was made of the assets. The plaintiff received its
aliquot share of the insolvent estate on the basis of a third class claim. Twentyone months 2 later plaintiff filed objection in the probate court to the defendant's final account on the ground that the claim was improperly classified, but
later withdrew it and commenced suit'in the Federal district court under
31 U. S. C. § 1923 contending (1) it was not bound by the judgment of the
probate court; or (2) that if it were bound, defendant had become a trustee
for the Government and that it was his duty to appeal from the judgment of
the probate court. The district court held that the defendant was trustee for
all the creditors, that it was the duty of the Government to appeal from the
(Pope, 1937) Ch. 1, § 97 provides that:
"All demands against the estate'of any deceased person shall be divided into the'
following classes.
First. Funeral expenses....
Second. Judgments rendered against the deceased, in his life time and which are
liens on lands of deceased, if he died possessed of any; otherwise to be regarded as
debts due by contract.
Third. All demands, without regard to quality, which shall be exhibited to the
executor, or administrator, properly authenticated, within six months after the first
granting of letters on the estate.
Fourth. All such demands as may be exhibited as aforesaid after six months and
1ARK. DIG. STAT.

within one year after the first letters granted on the estate, and all such demands not
exhibited to the executor or administrator as required by this Act, before the end
of
2 one year from the granting of letters shall be barred."
Under Act 164 of the Acts of the General Assembly of Arkansas (1939) an appeal
to the probate proceedings must be taken within six months.
3REv. STAT. § 3467 (1875) :
"Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person who pays any debt
due by the person or estate from whom or for which he acts, before he satisfies and
pays the debts due to the United States from such persbn or estate, shall become
answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of such payments for the
debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof as may remain due and
unpaid."
See also REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U. S. C. § 191 (1940)
"Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the
estate of any deceased debtor in the hands of an executor is insufficient to pay all
the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor,
not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment
thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent
debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of Bankruptcy
is committed."
This latter section is to be read in pari nateria with the preceding section of the title.
United States v. Giger, 26 F. Supp. 624 (D. C. Ark. 1939); United States v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 50 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), aff'g 19 F. (2d) 157 (S. D.
N. Y. 1926).
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judgment of the probate court, and having failed to take a timely appeal, its
right was barred by the Arkansas Statute of Limitations. 4 Since the Government had become a party to the proceedings in the probate court, it was
subject to its jurisdiction and was bound by the decree. The district court
suggested that bad the Government remained aloof from the proceeding and
had it given the administrator notice of the claim, the administrator would
have been bound at his peril to see that the rights of the Government to
priority were fully protected.5
This dictum would appear to introduce a new duty and an indefensibly
stringent standard of care for the executor or administrator. 6 In support
of its position, the district court cited Field v. United States7 and United
States v. Huntington National Bank.8
In the Field case a Louisiana insolvent, whose debts to the Government
had been reduced to judgment, made an assignment of assets to the defend4

See note 2 supra.
547 F. Supp. at 968.
6In Arkansas, it is the duty of the executor or administrator to approve or disallow
the claims [ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) Ch. 1, § 107] and to keep a list of all demands
legally exhibited against the estate, classify the same, and return such list every year
at the term at which the administrator is required to make such settlement [Id. at § 108].
Should the executor or administrator refuse to allow a claim after exhibition to him,
such claimant may then proceed to present his claim to the court after giving the administrator ten days' notice [Id. at § 110].
See 2 WoERNER, AMrERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) § 390:
"If the administrator does not deem the claim a just one, or if some person having
a legal right to do so objects to its allowance, or if, for any reason, he is unwilling
to allow the claim, he should reject it, and remit the claimant to his action at law,
or other proceeding allowed by statute, to establish it; and the claimant must then
bring his action upon the claim as it was when rejected by the administrator."
(Italics ours.)
Under 31 U. S. C. §§ 191, 192, a condition to any liability of the administrator would
appear to be notice to him of a "debt due the Government." It would not appear under
these sections that the mere notice of a claim by the government against the estate would
place the administrator at his peril until the claim was adjudged a "debt due the Government."
Where a debt was unequivocally owed to the United States it is clear that such debt
must be paid first. Bramwell v. United States Fidelity and, Guaranty Co., 269 U. S. 483,
46 Sup. Ct. 176 (1925); Price v. United States, 269 U. S. 492, 502, 46 Sup. Ct. 180,
182 (1925); United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 269 U. S. 504, 46 Sup. Ct.
179 (1925).
In United States v. Porter, 19 F. (2d) 541, 24 F. (2d) 139 (D. Idaho, 1927) it was
held that priority was extended to deposits of postal and forestry funds in insolvent banks.
But as there were still sufficient funds on hand to pay the Government claims, the question of the liability of the ssignee did not arise.
In United States v. Barnes, 24 Blatchf. 466, 31 Fed. 705 (Circ. Ct., S. D. N. Y. 1887)
the Government had a claim against the insolvent of $540,000 for evasion of the revenue
laws. After distribution was made of the $32,000 of the insolvent's estate, the Governme'nt recovered a judgment of $99,000 on the claims. The distributor was held liable
for $32,000. This is an example of a contingent claim neglected by the distributor.
79 Pet. 182, 9 L. ed. 94 (1885).
834 F. Supp. 578 (S. D. W. Va. 1940), aff'd, 117 F. (2d) 376 (C.' C. A. 4th, 1941)
(mem.)
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ant syndics. With knowledge of these judgments the defendants created a
tableau of distribution which failed to mention the Government debts. The
Government did not appear in the insolvency proceedings, the tableau was
approved by the parish court, and distribution was made. Upon suit under
the Duty of Collection -Act of 1799, 9 the forerunner of the present statute,
the United States Supreme Court held the defendants liable for their perverse conduct. In the opinion, Chief Justice Marshall declared that, if the
defendants had not had knowledge of the judgments, a different question
would have arisen. 10
In the Huntington Bank case the executor filed a federal estate tax
return upon which an estate tax was levied. Despite notice that there was
a tax deficiency, the defendant executor distributed all of the assets of the
estate to the widow and made a final statement of accounts in which he
failed t; include the proposed tax deficiency. The court held that a cause of
action was stated under 31 U. S. C. § 192.
Neither case appears to be adequate authority for the statement that when
the executor or administrator has notice of a Government claim that he must
secure at his peril judicial approval of the priority due to it. In both cases
the defendants not only failed to give the claim priority, they neglected to
include the claim and/or to provide for it in their 'scheme of distribution.
Clearly the administrator would be liable tinder the expressed intent of 31
U. S. C. §§ 191, 192.
In the instant case the administrator, under legal advice, allowed and
classified the claim to the best of his ability and presented it to the probate
court. Under existing, authority" the court held that the claim was not entitled to priority. It would seem that a mere change in procedure suggested
by the district court whereby the Government would present the claim to the
executor or administrator without becoming a party to the proceedings would
not place an added burden upon the administrator. If such were true in the
future the Government would so deal with all its estate claims. It would save
the Government the burden of any litigation in the probate court. The
Government would not only preserve all its existing rights but would saddle
an absolute liability upon the executor or administrator to litigate its rights
whenever judicially denied. Moreover, the Government would never run the
risk of being barred by a local statute of limitations for its failure to appeal
an adverse decision of the probate court.
The advantage is strikingly illustrated in the instant case. When presented,
the claim of the Federal Housing Administration was not entitled to pri0
DUTY CoLLEcTIoN Act oF 1799, c. 22, § 65, 1, STAT. 676.
109 Pet. at 200, 9 L.ed. at 101 (1885).
lThe Court cites Federal Housing Administrator v. Moore, 90 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A.

9th, 1937). For other cases to similar effect see: In re Long Island Sash and Door Corp.,

259 App. Div. 688, 20 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 573, aff'd, 284 N. Y. 713, 31 N. E. (2d) 48

(mem.), cert. den., 312 U. S. 696, 61 Sup. Ct. 732 (1940); li. re Dickson's Estate, 197
Wash., 145, 84 P. (2d) 661 (1938); accord, Korman v. Federal Housing Administrator,
113 F. (2d ) 743 (App. D. C., 1940); Wagner v. McLean, 96 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938); Note (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv. 320.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 29

ority. 12 Six months later the right to appeal the decision of the probate court
was barred. 13 Twenty-one months later the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Emory'4 held that such claim was entitled to priority, and
suit was commenced against the administrator. It scarcely seems plausible
under such circunstances that, had the Government merely given notice of
the claim to the administrator, the administrator, after acting on legal advice,
in good faith and under the direction of the probate court, could be held
personally liable, as the dictum of the district court would seem to indicate.
-Although the status of a Federal Housing Administration claim has been
decided, there are many other situations where a similar question might
arise. It has been held that claims presented by the Director General under
the Federal Control Act at the end of the last war were not entitled to
priority ;15 that debts owing to, or contracted by, the United States Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, when acting as a principal, were not
entitled to priority ;16 that veterans' funds prior to distribution in an insolvent bank were not entitled to priority ;17 and that a surety upon the bond of
van insolvent bank which is the depository of bankruptcy funds is not entitled to priority.' 8 Nor is it clearly determined when the claims of the Government will have priority over other types of claims. The statute involved
does not create a lien in favor of the Government. 9 When the debtor parts
with his property, absolutely or conditionally, before the Government claim
aris.es, by mortgage or by lien, the priority of the United States does not
attach to the property.20 It seems probable that there may be many claims
1247 F. Supp. At 966.
13 See note 2 s=pra.

14314 U. S. 423, 62 Sup. Ct. 317 (1941) ; Reed, Roberts, Douglas, and Jackson, JJ.,
dissenting.
15 Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co., 271 U. S. 236, 46 Sup. Ct. 511 (1925), affirming Davis
v. Michigan Trust Co., 2 F. (2d) 194 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) (on the basis that since the

Government stood as a railroad corporation operating a common carrier it would be
unjust to give it priority arising from a commercial venture).

16United States v. Wood, 290 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), aff'd, 263 U. S. 280, 44

Sup. Ct. 134 (1923); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386 (1922). But cf. Whan v. Green Star
SS Corp., 22 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927), cert, den., 276 U. S. 269, 48 Sup. Ct. 322
(1928)
(where a note for a ship sold by the Shipping Board was held entitled to priority).
1T Spicer v. Smith, 288 U. S. 415, 53 Sup. Ct 415 (1933).
'SHartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Green, 223 Ala. 96, 134 So.-487 (1931);
Andrew v. Crawford County Bank, 208 Iowa 1248, 224 N. W. 499 (1929), cert. den.,
281 U. S. 725, 50 Sup. Ct. 239 (1930).
19It is clearly settled that 31 U. S. C. § 191 does not create a lien. Bramwell v. United

States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 269 U. S. 483, -46 Sup. Ct. 176 (1925) ; United States
v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 380, 2 L. ed. 304, 312 (1804) ; United States v. Western Union

Telegraph
Co., 50 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
2
0A mortgage of the debtor's property before the accrual of the right of priority is

superior to the claim of the United States. Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Co., 1 Pet.
386, 7 L. ed. 189 (1828) ; United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 533 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1929), aff'd, 280 U. S. 478, 50 Sup. Ct. 212 (1930).

Costs of administration are paid before Government claims. See In re Wyley, 292

Fed. 900, (N. D. Ga. 1923); United States v. Eggleston, 4 Sawy. 199, Fed. Cas. No.
15,027 (C. C. 1877). Also a claim for money loaned to a receiver to maintain the busi-
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held by administrative boards and agencies at the end of the present war
the right of priority of which will be doubtful. Since the Supreme Court
has hesitated to declare claims entitled to priority, 21 it would hardly seem
that Congress intended to impose an absolute liability upon the executor or
administrator which entailed the burden of securing the priority rights of
the United States.
Hamilton S. White

Labor Law: Minimum standard for women and children: Part time
wage.-Does Article 19 of the New York Labor Lawl which authorizes the
Industrial Commissioner to issue a minimum wage order empower him to
fix a so-called "guaranteed wage" for women and minors for part time employment? (A "guaranteed wage" is a required or ordered wage.) In Lincoln
Candies, Inc., v. Department of Labor, 289 N. Y. 262, 45 N. E. (2d) 434
2
(1942), the Court of Appeals, reversing the special term and the appellate
3
division, answered the question affirmatively by a vote of four to three. The
vital social significance of the question is evidenced by the fact that the attorney generals of Minnesota, Illinois, Utah, New Hampshire, and North
Dakota, as anicus curiae, filed a brief in support of the Commissioner's power
to fix a "guaranteed wage"- for part time employment. Under Directory

ness was entitled to priority over Government claims. In re Holmes Manufacturing Co.,
19 F. (2d) 239 (D. Conn. 1927).

But a priority of the United States is not defeated by a mere judgment in the hands of
the creditor. Conard v. Atlantic Insirance Co., 1 Pet. 386, 7 L. ed. 189 (1828) ; Thelusson v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396, 4 L. ed. 271 (1817).

There is a conflict of authority as to the effect of a prior attachment: Holding that the
Government loses its priority, see Beaston v. Farmers Bank, 12 Pet. 102, 134, 9 L. ed.
1017, 1029 (1838); United States v. Canal Bank, 3 Story 79, Fed. Cas. No. 14,175
(C. C. 1844) ; that the Government retains its priority, see Willing v. Blecker, 2 Serg.

& Raw. 221 (Penn. 1816) ; United States v. Clason, 4 S. C. L. 118, 2 Brev. 529 (1806).

There is some authority that the priority beats a claim for a widow's allowance. Federal Reserve Bank v. Smylie, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 134 S. W. (2d) 838 (1939).
A distributor is not liable when he pays a perfected lien in disregard of the Govern-

ment's claim for income taxes. Union Guardian Trust Co. v. C. I. R., 41 B. T. A. 1306
(1940). So also when there is a claim by laborers or materialmen under a statute creating a perfected lien, the Government is not entitled to priority. Ernst v. Guarantee Mill-

work, 200 Wash. 195, 93 P. (2d) 404 (1939). But see Lerman v. Lincoln Novelty Co.,
130 N. J. Eq. 144, 21 A. (2d) 828 (1941). In Emory v. United States, 314 U. S. 423,

62 S. Ct. 317 (1941), the effect of § 104 of Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Act) was discussed, and priority was denied to wage claimants on the basis that they had a mere
inchoate lien.

The question of priority is a federal question, and if the court of last resort within te
state denies priority, the decision may be reviewed in the United States Supreme Court.
Trust Co. v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 381 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
People's
21
See notes 15, 16, 17, 18 supra.
IN. Y. LABOR LAW, §§ 550-566 (L. 1937, c. 276, § 1).

2175 Misc. 399, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 626 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
3263 App. Div. 1058, 34 N. Y. S. (2d) 335 (4th-Dep't 1942).
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Order No. 3, the Commissioner had established a basic hourly rate of thirtyfive cents for women and minors in the confectionery industry. The order
further required a minimum wage of ten dollars for three days or less during
the peak season, and seven dollars for two days or less during
the slack
4
season, irrespective of the number of hours actually worked.
Section 555 of the Labor Law provides that the Commissioner and the
Wage Board in establishing a minimum wage "(1) may take into account the
amoulnt sufficient to provide adequate maintenance and to protect health
(2) may take into account the value of the service and class of service rendered, and (3) may consider the wages paid in the state for work of like or
comparable nature." In a vigorous dissent, Judge Finch 5 declared that Directory Order No. 3 was invalid since Section 555 required the Commissioner
to take into account both "the value of service and the class of service rendered," while the order provided for a wage rate for part-time employment
without regard to the value of service rendered.
The majority of the court agreed with the minority in construing the
clause "may take into account" in Section 555 to mean "must take into
account," but insisted that the Commissioner must "take into account not
only the worth of labor but also the dmount sufficient to provide adequate
maintenance and to protect health." 6 "The very concept of minimum wage
legislation necessarily involves the determination of the cost of living
4

Directory Order No. 3 became effective on November 14, 1938. Five similar minimum
wage orders are now in effect in various industries in New York.
Order No. 1 issued on March 7, 1938, for the laundry industry, set a minimum weekly
wage of $14 for a forty hour week in New York City, Nassau and Westchester counties.
The validity of the order has been upheld in HutchMns v. Department of Labor, 173 Misc.
924, 18 N. Y! S. (2d) 656 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
Directory Order No. 2, effective August 1, 1938, established a minimum wage of $16.50
for full time employees for a forty-five hour week in the beauty shop industry. The order
also required that part time workers receive a minimum wage of $4 per day for eight
hours or less. For more than three days in one week, the minimum weekly wage was to
be the same as for full time employment.
'Directory Order No. 4 was promulgated on May 8, 1939, for the cleaning and dyeing
industry. Minimum hourly rates were set by the order varying from 36 cents in the
metropolitan district to 33 cents in commuoities of under 10,000 population for a basic
work week of forty hours.
On June 3, 1940, Directory Order No. 5 put into effect a 'minimum wage rate in the
restaurants of New York. In New York City, the hourly minimum wage for waitresses
was set at 18 cents for the nine calendar months from June 3, 19 cents for the following
twelve months, and 20 cents thereafter. For women and minor employees other than
waitresses in New York City restaurants, the hourly minimum rate was fixed at 29 cents
for nine calendar months, and 30 cents thereafter. *
Directory Order No. 6 covers all establishments, such as hotels, clubs, resident houses,
and camps, which offer lodging accommodations to the public, to employees, or to members or guests of members. The minimum hourly rates for employees who do not receive meals or lodging are 26 cents an hour for service employees, 33 cents for chambermaids and bathmaids, and 36 cents for all other employees. For workers who receive one
meal a day, the rates are 3 cents less per hour; for those who get two meals a day, the
rates
are 6 cents less.
5
Lewis and Conway, JJ., concurred with Judge Finch.

6289 N. Y. 262, 266, 45 N. E. (2d) 434, 436 (1942).
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and the fixing of a wage that will reasonably cover or approach that cost.
The idea of a 'living wage' is the heart and core of all such legislation."
A minimum wage computed solely on the basis of the market value of the part
time employee's hourly service multiplied by the numbei of hours actually
made available to him affords little economic security for him. Any formula
for wage determination which disregards the assurance of "adequate maintenance and health," would nullify the purpose of the statute. Clearly a "living
wage" need not be consistent with the market value of the work actually
done in every period of employment, however short.
In 1923, the Supreme Court of the United States in Adkins v. Children's
Hospitals declared that a minimum wage statute of the District of Columbia9
contravened the fifth amendment of the federal Constitution. Fourteen years
later, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the Adkins case in West Coast
10
and approved a minimum wage law of the state of
Hotel Co. v. ParrishWashington", which authorized a minimum wage "adequate in the occupation
or industry in question to supply the necessary cost of living, and maintain
the workers in health.' u2 That the Washington statute did not require payment according to "the value of service" which Mr. Justice Sutherland thought
a constitutional requisite in the Adkins case, was not deemed controlling. One
point stressed in the Adkins case was that the standard fixed by the District
of Columbia act failed to make adequate allowance for the value of services
rendered. Although the Washington statute resembled the District of Columbia law which was invalidated, the Supreme Court was unable to find "that
the state has passed beyond the boundary
in its minimum wage requirement
3
of its broad protective power."'
The Supreme Court in the Parrishcase approved the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes in the Adkins case. "This statute does not compel anybody to pay anything. It simply forbids employment at rates below those
14
fixed as the minimum wage requirement of health and right living."' The
social interest in the economic conditions of women workers, and the dependence of their standard of living upon the wages they receive make a
"living wage" an indispensable minimum. That the New York Legislature had
this objective in mind when, in 1937, it passed Article 19 of the Labor Law
cannot be doubted.
Wage orders very similar to the one in, question are in operation in
Ubid.
8261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
940 STAT. 960, c. 174 (1918).

10300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937).
"lWash. Laws 1913, c. 174; WAsn. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932)
12289 N. Y. 262, 266, 45 N. E. (2d) 434, 436 (1942).
18300 U. S. 379, 396, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 584 (1937) (Hughes, C.J.).
14261 U. S. 525, 570, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 406 (1933).

§ 7623 et seq.
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19

Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,' Ohio, Washand the District of Columbia.21 Judge Finch asserted, in his dis-

senting opinion, that the order, in effect, outlawed part time employment. The
presence of casual labor always presents a serious problem because of the
mode of life it imposes on the worker. This problem had its origin it the rise
of capitalistic production, but modern developinents tend toward the partial,
elimination of its demoralizing effects. 22 The brief filed as amicus curiae by
the attorney generals of Minnesota, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
and Utah declared, "an order fixing a wage which covers the application of
a given rate of pay to a defined period of time can eliminate sporadic, part
time, and irregular employment and substitute instead regular employment
and basic readjustment of the'2 3industry to provide living wages, commensurate

with the services rendered.

A fundamental question in minimum wage cases is the reasonableness of
the order. Since the Brandeis brief in Muller v. Oregon,24 the necessity for
supporting statistically the reasonableness of this type of legislation has been
generally recognized. To effectuate the public policy exemplified by the New
York Minimum Wage Law, intensive studies were made of wages and working conditions in industries to which the law was to apply, and a statewide
survey of the cost of "adequate living" for working women was instituted. 25
The record on appeal in the principal case shows that before promulgating
Directory Order No. 3 the Wage Board collected persuasive data for determining a fair and reasonable wage. 26
If the basis of all minimum wage legislation is a "living wage," the fixation
1546 MONTHELY LABOR REv. 196 (1938). The laundry and wash dress industries are
co~ered by minimum wage orders.
16Ibid. The state minimum wage orders cover the laundry, dry cleaning, electrical
equipment and supplies, candy, men's furnishing, women's clothing, toys, games, and
sportswear industries.
17Id. at 197. Minimum wage orders are in effect in the clothing, hosiery, and knit
goods industries.
'1id.at 198. A wage order is in effect for the laundry industry.
19bid. Minimum wage orders for hotels and restaurants.
201d.
at 200. Wage orders cover the canning and beauty culture industries.
2
d. at 196. Minimum wage order in the retail trade, laundry, and wash dress industries.
22
Brissenden, Casual Labor, 3 ENcyc. Soc. ScraNcEs 260 (1930).
23
Motion for Leave to File Statement, Amicis Curiae, 3 Lincoln Candies, Inc., v.
Department of Labor, 289 N. Y. 262, 45 N. E. (2d) 434 (1942).
24208 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1908).
251940 Ann. Rep't of Industrial Commissionwr (N. Y. State Dep't of Labor, No. 21).
26
1n determining the order, the Wage Board found the annual cost of living for
'an adequate maintenance to be: for a woman living alone in 1937, $1,182.46; for a woman
living as a member of a family, $1,058.31. Of 61 women in this industry working under
16 hours per week, 83.6 per cent were making less than $5 and the rest, 16.4 per cent,
were making between $5 and $10 per week. Of 158 women working from 16 to 24 hours
per week, 18.4 per cent were making less than $5; 77.8 per cent were making from $5
to $10; and 3.8 per cent making from $10 to $15. Transcript of Record before the Board
of Standards and Appeals, Record on Appeal, pp. 337, 335, 199. Lincoln Candies Inc., v.
Department of Labor, 289 N.-Y. 262; 45 N. E. (2d) 434 (1942).
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of a bare wage rate per hour or even per day with sole regard to the' market
value of the services performed will not accomplish the desired legislative
purpose. The gradual elimination of sporadic, irregular, and casual employment can be accomplished only by guaranteeing a "living wage" reasonably
commensurate with the services actually rendered.
Daniel Jay Loventhal

Nuisance: Defense plant producing critical material for armed forces
justified in causing the public some discomfort: Order of War Department as affecting reasonableness of defendant's conduct.-In People v.
Ainecco Chemicals, Inc.,
, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 330 (Rochester City
Court, 1943), the court stated the facts as follows:
"The defendant is charged with maintaining a public nuisance in
violation of Section 1530 subdivision 1 of the Penal Law defining the
offense as 'unlawfully doing any act, or omitting to perform a duty,
which act or omission . . . annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort,

repose, health, or safety of any considerable number of persons.' * * *
"Persons living in the vicinity of the defendant's plant were affected
by fumes escaping therefrom in the course of its manufacture of a
product for the War Department .... highly essential for the protection

of the armed forces in the field. * * *
"Early in 1941 the War Department made a survey to determine the
number of makers of this product [clorinated paraffin to be used for
flame proofing and gas proofing tentage and the uniforms of soldiers,
sailors, and marines]. * * *
"ln this great emergency Colonel Clough of the Chemical Division
of the War Department ordered the defendant not to shut down to
accomplish the expansion but to 'cut in' new units as they were completed. This resulted in the escape of hydrocloric acid and some chlorine
gas into the atmosphere. There were other escapes of gas not directly
due to the 'cutting in' method, but they were all more or less due to
conditions that might be expected to arise in the hurried performance
of an exacting task in a great emergency. ...
"It satisfactorily appears that the equipment installed was the best
obtainable and adequate for the purposes; and that the defendant used
every reasonable means to obtain competent help and to train it.
"The defendant's plant is in a heavy industrial zone and abuts on
,the south side of the main line of the New York Central Railroad.
North of and a few hundred feet from the railroad there are houses,
including the residences of a considerable number of people claiming
to have been affected by the fumes. * * *
"Residents of the neighborhood testified that the fumes were so strong
that they could not sit on their porches in the summer, that they bad to
close bedroom windows, that the fumes caused coughing, that they
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In no case was illness caused and no one called a

physician."
Evidence of damage to communication wires and copper rail bonds of, the
railroad and to copper fuses and switches of the Rochester Gas and Electric
Company was introduced to show the degree of concentration of HCI in
the atmosphere.
The City Court of Rochester properly held the defendant not guilty.
The statute here applied has been interpreted by the courts to be declaratory of the commof law.' It is a definition of an offense against the public
in the enjoyment of common 'rights, and not of an bffense against a large
number of persons in the enjoyment of private rights not shared by the
members of the community. The words "any 'considerable number of persons" are used solely for the purpose of differentiating the crime of public
nuisance from the tort of private nuisance. 2 Since the statute confirms the
common law, not every interference with the comfort and repose of the
people will constitute the offense, but only such interferences as arise from
unreasonable conduct.8
It is well settled that the conduct of a lawful business in a proper location
with a proper regard for the rights of the public is a reasonable use of
property and does not constitute a public nuisance. 4 But this rule is not
determinative of the principal case, because the escape of the noxious fumes
might have been prevented had the plant been closed down while the expansion was being effected.
In determining whether the defendant has used his property uhreasonably, the benefits to the public' resulting from defendant's conduct are
weighed against the harm to public or private rights. 5 If the benefits outweigh the disadvantages, a criminal action is inappropriate for its only
purpose would be to deter or prohibit the beneficial conduct. In the principal
case the interest of the public in equipping the armed forces obviously outweighs the public interest in protecting citizens from the consequences of
breathing unwholesome air.
The defendant's conduct may be shown to be reasonable by reference to
another well established principle. 6 Where an activity is specially authorized
'People v. Borden'9 Condensed Milk Co., 165 App. Div. 711, 151 N. Y. Supp. 547
(2d Dep't 1915), aff'd 216 N. Y. 658, 110 N. E. 1046 (1915) ; People v. Transit Development
Co., 131 App. Div. 174, 115 N. Y. Supp. 297 (2d Dep't 1909).
2
People v. Kings County Iron Foundry, 209 N. Y. 207, 102 N. E. 598 (1913).
3
Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray (Mass.) 473 (1856); People v. Horton, 64 N. Y.
610 (1876); Commonwealth y. Miller, 139 Pa. 77, 21 Atl. 138, 23 Am. St. Rep. 170
(1890).
4
People v. Dayton Cleaners & Dyers Corp., 251 App. Div. 332, 296 N. Y. Supp.
1295 (2d Dep't 1937) ; People v. Vanderwater, 250 N. Y. 83, 89, 164 N. E. 864 (1928).
in a prosecution for maintaining a public nuisance, the doctrine of public compensation applies, and itmay be shown that the public inconveniences are absorbed in the
greater public advantages directly resulting from the act complained of. People v.
Transit
Development Co., 131 App. Div. 174, 115 N. Y. Supp. 297 (2d Dep't 1909).
6
"Just as the legislature, within its constitutional limitations, may declare particular
conduct or a' particular use of property to be a nuisance, it may authorize that which
would otherwise be a nuisance." PROSsER, ToRTs (1941) 594 and cases cited n. 15.
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or commanded by law, it cannot, in .the eyes of the law, be unreasonable.
Thus, where the maintenance of a gas works was authorized by the New
York legislature and the plant was equipped with proper appliances, it was
not a nuisance, because the legislative consent made the defendant's conduct
reasonable." Assuming that the order of the War Department was valid,
the defendant's compliance could scarcely be held unreasonable. This case
is not an example of the war power eating away the reserve powers of the
states, although it may appear that the order was in direct conflict with the
state statute. By reading into the statute the word "reasonable," flexibility
is imparted, and the order may be regarded as a fact establishing the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. "It will not be pregumed that Congress
intended to exclude the reserve powers of the state (from operation in a
particular field) by virtue of paramount powers vested in Congress . . .
unless an actual conflict exists between Federal and State legislation." If
the state statute and the order of the War Department could not be reconciled, it is probable that the order would prevail.9
The sufferings of private persons particularly injured by defendant's
conduct need not necessarily go without redress. An injunction should not
be granted, to be sure, for as already pointed out, the defendant's manufacture of a material vital to the war effort should not be disrupted. Injuries
to private persons should be accounted 'one of the costs of the war effort,
and their recovery against the defendant charged to the government through
an adjustment in defendant's war contracts. The difficulty with this proposition is that the War Department would probably refuse to recognize such
expenses as a basis for renegotiating the defendant's war contracts upward.
While this objection has some weight, it ought not of itself prevent recovery, since, when the contracts were entered into, the probability of some
litigation in connection with their performance should have been taken into
account.
The fact that tl~e defendant's conduct has been adjudged reasonable in
an action for maintaining a public nuisance will not prevent a recovery
in private nuisance. In private nuisance "liability is imposed in those cases
where the harm or, risk to one is greater than he ought to be required to
bear under the circumstances, at least without compensation."' 0 The emphasis is on the unreasonableness of the plaintiff's harm, not on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct in the light of the public interest.
7People
v. New York Gas-Light Co., 64 Barb. (N. Y.) 55 (1872).
8
Matter of Cassaretakis, 289 N. Y. 119, 130, 44 N. E. (2d) 391, 397 (1942).
9
"The authority of State laws or their administration may not interfere with the
carrying out of a national purpose. Where enforcement of the State law would handicap
efforts to carry out the plans of the United States, the State enactment must, of course,
give way." United States v. Mayo, 47 F. Supp. 552, 557 (N. D. Fla. 1942). "When
requisite to this end [preservation of the life of the nation] the liberty of the citizenthe protection of private property-the peace-time rights of the states must all y.ield
to necessity." Public Service Commission v. N. Y. C. R.R. Co., 230 N. Y. 149, 152,
129 N. E. 455, 456 (1920). Not only may the congressional power be exercised directly,
but discretionary powers may be delegated to the executive or to state officials. Selective
Draft
Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159 (1917).
10
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 822, comment j.
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Nevertheless, facts which tend to estdblish the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct may, to a lesser degree, go to show that the plaintiff's injury
is not so unreasonable as to require compensation.
"The defendant's privilege of making a reasonable use of his own
property for his own benefit and conducting his affairs in his own way
is no less important than the plaintiff's right to use and enjoy his premises. The two are correlative and interdependent, and neither is entitled
to prevail entirely, at the expense of the other.,.

.

. The plaintiff must be

expected to endure some inconvenience rather than curtail the defendant's freedom of action, and the defendant must so use his own property that he causes no unreasonable harm to the plaintiff.""
In private nuisance as in public nuisance, if the conduct of the defendant
is specially authorized by law, the plaintiff's suffering will not ordinarily
be considered so substantial and unreasonable as to require redress. "In
general it may be said that there is power to authorize minor interferences
with the convenience of property owners, but not major ones, unless the
land is condemned and compensation given under the law of eminent domain.' 12 Thus, in one case, the plaintiff had procured an injunction against
the ringing of a bell. The legislature subsequently authorized the ringing
of bells under certain circumstances. The act was held constitutional although it 'deprived the plaintiff of her injunction and authorized an interference with the enjoyment of her property which before the enactment
had been deemed unreasonable.' 3
In the principal case, the order of the War Department might be offered
to show that the interference with the rights of the plaintiff is not unreasonably great under the circumstances. In rebuttal it may be argued that the
exercise of the war power is bounded by the requirements of due process
of law,14 and that therefore the order did not contemplate a substantial
interference with the enjoyment of private rights;, or, that if it did, it
was invalid and, therefore, could not be relied upon by the defehdant as
a justification.
The court was correct in holding the defendant not guilty of maintaining
a public nuisance because the defendant's activities were reasonable so far
as the public was concerned for the reason that in the main they benefited
the public and because they were in conformity with an order, which, by
hypothesis, was valid and hence had the force of law. The fact that the
defendant's conduct is reasonable in this sense should not of itself prevent
persons particularly injured from recovering damages if they have suffered
harm so substantial that due process of law and fairness require that they
be compensated.
Edward M. Snmllwood
"1PRossER,
TORTS (1941) 580.
2
3 1d. at 594.
3
' 4Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239 (1884).
1 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. 106 (1919).
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Restraints of trade: Sherman Anti-Trust Act: Whether American Medical Association may be guilty of restraints: Exemptions of a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.-Several medical societies and
physicians, including a corporation of Illinois, a corporation of the District
of Columbia, two unincorporated associations in the District of Columbia,
and twenty-one individuals, were charged with illegally obstructing Group
Health, a non-profit corporation organized in the District of Columbia by government employees to hire doctors and provide medical 'care and hospitalization on a risk-sharing, pre-payment basis. The district court had sustained
a demurrer to the indictment on the ground that neither Group Health nor
the practice of medicine were "trades" within the meaning of the Sherman
Act since the courts of the United States in interpreting the common law
took a narrow view of "trade" as embracing only operations or pursuits of
a mercantile character.1 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed, holding that the practice of medicine and the business of Group
Health were "trades."' 2 The Supreme Court granted -certiorari limited to
three questions: (1) Whether the practice of medicine and the rendering of
medical services as described in the indictment are "trade" under Section 3
of the Sherman Act; (2) Whether the indictment charged or the evidence
proved "restraints of trade" under Section 3 of the Sherman Act; (3)
Whether a dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment under
the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts was involved, and, if so, whether
petitioners were interested therein, and therefore immune from prosecution
under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held the defendants guilty of
violating the Sherman Act without answering the first question. The second
question was answered in the affirmative and the third question in the negative. American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, 63 Sup.
Ct. 326 (1943).
The Supreme Court upheld the position of the court of appeals that
Group Health, although a co-operative, was a business or trade within the
meaning of the -Sherman Act, but did not sustain the holding that the practice of medicine was a "trade," finding that such a determination was unnecessary since the defendants as individuals are "persons" prohibited from
certain activities3 and might therefore be found guilty if,
the purpose and
1
United States v. American Medical Association, 28 F. Supp. 752, 755, 756, 757 (D. C.
Dist. Col. 1939). In Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S.427, 436, 52
Sup. Ct. 607, 610 (1932) trade was defined thus: "Whenever any occupation, employ-

ment, or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or livelihood, not in the
liberal
arts or in the learned professions [italics added), it is constantly called a trade."
2
United States v. American Medical Association, 110 F. (2d) 703, 710, 711 (App.
D. C. 1940). The case then went to trial in the district court, where the defendants were
held guilty of restraints of trade. Petitioners appealed to the court of appeals which
reiterated its ruling on the applicability of § 3 of the Sherman Act. 130 F. (2d) 233
(App. D. C. 1943).
3
American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U. S.519, 528, 63 Sup. Ct. 326,
adv. sheet No. 6 (1943). See Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890)i 15 U. S. C.
§ 3 (1940).: "Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce .. .is declared illegal. Every person who shall make
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effect of their conspiracy was the restraint of the business of Group Health. 4
The defendants urged that this doctrine had been announced before the
Supreme Court decided Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader,5 but the Court
held that nothing in that decision contradicts the proposition stated, and
"whether the conspiracy was aimed at restraining or destroying competition,
or had as its purpose a restraint of the free availability of medical and hospital services,
the Apex Hosiery Company case places it within the scope of the
6
statute."
In considering the second question, the Court found that the issues were
fairly presented to the jury and its findings that the defendants were guilty
of acts of coercion and conspiracy against Group H-ealth should not be disturbed. The judge's charge to the jury was upheld: "'If it be true ...that
the District Society, acting only to protect its organization, regulate fair dealings among its members, and maintain and advance the standards of medical
practice, adopted reasonable rules and measures to those ends, not calculated to restrain Group Health, there would be no guilt, though the indirect
effect may have been to cause some restraint against Group Health.' "
The'third question involved the applicability of the Clayton8 and NorrisLaGuardia 9 Acts and the possibility that the defendants would be immune
from the operation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that this
was not a labor dispute since conditions of employment were not involved. 1
It would not have been a strained construction of the statute to have held
that doctors are individuals in the same "occupation," who have a "direct or
indirect interest" in the conditions of work of others similarly engaged. The
Court, however, found that the defendants' were not interested in condiany such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor.
4
American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, 528, 63 Sup. Ct.
326 (1943).
5310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1939).

6317 U. S.519, 529, 63 Sup. Ct. 326 (1943).

7Td. at 533, 63 Sup. Ct. at 330-331.
838 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17, 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1940).

927

STAT.

70 (1943), 29 U. S. C. §§ 104-106, 108, 113.'

' 0 The Norris-LaGuardia Act broadly defines a case growing out of a labor dispute
as one involving "persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; ...
or who are members of the same
or an afrfliated organization of employers or employees . . . or when the case involves
any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' (as defined in this section)
of 'persons participating or interested' therein (as defined)." A person or association is
"participating or interested in a labor dispute if . . . engaged in the same industry,
trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect
interest therein, or is a member, officer 6r agent of any association composed in whole
or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation. The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions
of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee." r29 U. S. C. § 113 (1940)1.

1943]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

tions of employment since they were not employees or prospective employees
and there was no dispute between Group Health and its employees.
The Court could have applied here the reasoning of New Negro Alliance
v. Sanitary Co." There, an association of negr6es organized for the mutual
improvement of its members and to promote civic, educational, benevolent,
and charitable enterprises, requested a grocery company to employ negro
clerks in the course of personnel changes in stores patronized by colored
people. When their request was ignored, members of the association picketed
the grocery company. The Court refused to grant the grocery company an
injunction against the picketing, finding that a labor dispute existed within
the definitions of Section 113 (a), (b) and (c) of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct, and emphasizing the fact that controversies need not be between employees and employers, employers and labor unions, or persons seeking employment and employers to be within the purport of the act.
Instead of following the New Negro case, the Court stated that the decision in Columbia River Packers Asso. v. Hinton 2 required a holding that
the medical societies' activities were not exempted by the Clayton and NorrisLaGuardia Acts from the operation of the Sherman Act. 13 In the Hinton
case, the defendants were fishermen .who combined in a union affiliated with
the C.I.O. to bargain collectively with purchasers of their fish. The
plaintiff, a cannery, refused to sign hn exclusive purchasing contract with
the defendants, who then boycotted it. The Court held that there was not a
dispute within the Norris-LaGuardia Act since the controversy was over
sales of commodities and not over labor conditions. Apparently the Court
feels that the selling of fish and the selling of medical services are analogous
situations and that both are outside the realm of labor disputes.
It is to be noted that the American Medical case was prosecuted under
Section 3 of the Sherman Act, which is applicable only to the District of
Columbia. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States' 4 was also brought
under Section 3 of the Sherman Act. There, the Court pointed out that
Section 3 and Section 1 are identically worded, but Section 3 is subject to
a broader interpretation. In Section 1 the words "'trade or commerce" must
be limited by the constitutional power to regulate commerce. Section 3, on
the other hand, comes pnder the plenary power of Congress to legislate for
the District of Columbia.' 5 Whether there would have been a similar hold7
ing in the American Medical case if it had been brought under Section 1,
which applies to transactions in interstate commerce, is undecided. The fact
that .the federal and state anti-injunction statutes 16 were not intended to
11303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct 703 (1937).
12315 U. S. 143, 62 Sup. Ct. 520 (1943).

13American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U. S. 519, 536, 63 Sup. Ct.
326, 332 (1943).

U. S. 427, 52 Sup. Ct. 607 (1932).
'DId. at 434, 52 Sup. Ct. at 609 (1932).
16NEw YORK GENERAL BusINEss LAW § 340 is similar to the Sherman Act. NEW
YORK GENERAL BUSINEss LAW '§ 340 (2) and C. P. A. § 876-a are similar to the NorrisLaGuardia Act. NEw YORK MEM3BERSHIP CoRroRATIoN LAW §§ 170-175 concerns the
14286
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immunize a dispute between professional persons is not a persuasive reason
why the protection of these acts should not be extended to such disputes,
since it is equally probable that the authors of the Sherman Act never intended to include professional groups within its monopoly and restraint of
trade prohibitions. 17It is difficult to say what the effect of this decision will be on the practice
of medicine. While some of the state medical journals were resentful, others
felt that the decision would prove beneficial in the long run in arousing the
profession to a more realistic approach to group medicine plans, which could
then be supervised by the American Medical Society.' 8 The obvious result
is that the medical associations, while recognized to have contributed a great
service, are restricted to enforcing their ethical standards by "the safer and
more kindly weapons of legitimate persuasion and reasoned argument."' 19.
Elizabeth Louise Krauss
regulation of 'medical societies. § 174 provides for the enforcement of discipline by the
society.
7

1 The Sherman Act originally was intended to be a "trust-busting" act to protect the
public against big business monopolies which, through superior numbers and capital and
unscrupulous business practices, threatened to abolish competition. United States v.
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S.1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249 (1895). The act was interpreted by the
courts to include labor unions [Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S.274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908)]
until 1914 when tle Clayton Act was passed expressly excluding labor. The court interpreted that act strictly. Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172
(1921). 'Resort was again had to legislation and the Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed
in 1932.
18(1943) 32 SURVEY GRAPmc 117.
19
American Medical Society v. United States, 130 F. (2d) 233, 248 (App. D. C. 1943).

